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SEX, DRUGS & GUNS: 
CANADA TACKLES VIOLENT 
CRIME
 
Effective May 1, 2008 some of Bill C-2’s 
provisions came into effect. This Bill, 
cited as the “Tackling Violent Crime 
Act” amends the Criminal Code in 
various areas, including:
• firearms offences;
• sexual predators;
• drug driving.
Guns
Under the new law, two new offences were added and 
minimum penalties for gun related crimes have been 
increased. It is now an offence under s.98 of the 
Criminal Code for a person to break and enter and 
steal a firearm. This section parallels the break and 
enter provisions found in s.348 by creating four 
separate ways to attach culpability:
• Breaking and entering with intent to steal a 
firearm;
• Breaking and entering and stealing a firearm;
• Breaking out after stealing a firearm;
• Breaking out after entering with intent to steal a 
firearm. 
Break has the same meaning as found in s.321 and 
“place” means any building or structure—or part of 
one—and any motor vehicle, vessel, aircraft, railway 
vehicle, container, or trailer. This definition differs 
somewhat from the definition of place found in s.348 
in that the new s.98 place includes a motor vehicle. 
The maximum punishment for this offence is life in 
prison and the offence does not distinguish between 
dwelling houses or not for sentencing purposes as 
s.348 does. 
Also a new provision, s.98.1 creates an offence of 
robbery with intent to steal a firearm or successfully  
stealing one. This offence also brings a maximum life 
sentence. Serious firearm offences have increased 
penalties for first (three year minimum) and 
subsequent offences (five year minimum). 
Furthermore, several firearm related offences 
involving the use of restricted or prohibited firearms 
will see minimum offences increased to five years (for 
a first offence) and seven years (for second and 
subsequent offences). An earlier offence, however,  
shall not be taken into account for the purpose of 
second and subsequent offences if 10 years has 
elapsed between the day of earlier conviction and the 
new conviction. (see page 46-47 for sentencing grid). 
Bail hearings for offences 
involving firearms or other 
weapons now restrict the release 
of charged persons. Where a person is 
held and brought before a justice for one of 
the applicable firearms or weapons offences, 
the onus shifts to the accused to justify release and 
why they should not be detained. 
Sex
The age for consenting to sexual activity has also been 
raised from 14 years of age to 16. When an accused is 
charged with a sexual offence, such as sexual 
interference, invitation to sexual touching, sexual 
exploitation, bestiality in the presence of or by a 
child, indecent exposure, or sexual assault, it is not a 
defence that the child or youth under the age of 16 
consented to the sexual activity. 
There are, however, close in age exceptions where 
consent by a person under 16 years of age is a defence.
 (continued on page 45)
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e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
“I really enjoy the 
articles published in 10-
8 as they are interesting 
and work worthy related.” - RCMP 
Constable, New Brunswick
*********
“I'd like to be added to your distribution 
list. It's a fantastic publication, with 
current and relevant information.” - RCMP 
Constable, Atlantic Canada
*********
“I was introduced to the 10-8 In service 
newsletter today for the first time. I 
read it through, especially the case law, 
and found it extremely informative and helpful.” - Police 
Detective, Ontario
*********
“This is a wealth of information for the 
21st century police officer. In today’s 
policing you need to stay on top of the 
latest case law rulings, and to do that you need to read, 
read, and read some more! With more then 25 years 
now in policing...I still learn something new each and 
every day I come to work! “ - Police Constable, Alberta 
*********
“Excellent publication, this should be 
standard reading for all police officers 
across the country. ... Greatly 
appreciated and again, great publication.” - RCMP 
Staff Sergeant, North West Territories
*********
“I would like to be added to your 
distribution list for your publication. One 
of my instructors in recruit classes let me 
read it and I have found it very beneficial now that I 
am on the streets. Thanks again.” - Police Constable, 
Alberta
*********
“Could you re-direct your great In 
Service:10-8 newsletter ... ?  I am soon to 
retire and would love to keep reading your 
newsletter and stay current. Thanks...” - Police 
Constable, Alberta
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IN-SERVICE LEGAL ROAD TEST
The “In Service” Legal 
Road Test is a simple 
multiple choice quiz 
designed to challenge your 
understanding of the law. 
Each question is based on a case featured in this issue. 
See page 27 for the answers.
1. Which of the following is an equivalent legal standard 
for a reasonable suspicion?
 (a) an educated guess;
 (b) random speculation;
 (c) an accurate hunch;
 (d) articulable cause;
 (e) reasonable and probable grounds.
2. The accused must prove an officer did not have 
reasonable grounds for a breath test when they 
challenge breathalyzer samples under s.8 of the 
Charter.
 (a) True
 (b) False
 
3. When relying on presumptive, or deemed, care or 
control under s.258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code the 
Crown is not required to prove a risk of danger to the 
public.  
 (a) True
 (b) False
4. A breach of a conditional sentence order does not 
create a new offence like breaching a probation 
order would.  
 (a) True
 (b) False
5. The Youth Criminal Justice Act’s adult sentencing 
scheme for presumptive offences, like murder and 
manslaughter, violates the Charter.
 (a) True
 (b) False
6. Which of the following connections between a 
Charter breach and the obtaining of evidence can 
result in the application of s.24(2).
    (a) temporal; 
 (b) causal;
 (c) contextual;
“I had the 10-8 forwarded to me and I 
immediately recognized its value to me as 
an investigator.  Please add me to the 
e-mail distribution list for future 10-8’s” - Police 
Detective, Alberta
*********
“I have been reading your newsletters 
since 2002 and have used them in the 
training of new and current ... Police since 
then. I find your articles get right to the point, and 
would like you to add me to your mailing list. .... Thanks.” 
- Police Sergeant, Ontario
*********
“My Supervisor just sent me a copy of 
your most recent issue & it's obvious 
that I NEED to subscribe! Great 
publication!  Thanx.” - Police Constable, New Brunswick
*********
“I find your material to be very 
educational; it is by far some of the most 
interesting police related documents I 
have read in a long time.” - Police Officer, Ontario
*********
“I just received the latest issue of 10-8 
and I must say you are doing an excellent 
job in producing this paper. ... Thanks for 
producing a great document.” - Ministry of the 
Environment Employee, Ontario
SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME 
(ABUSIVE HEAD TRAUMA) 
CONFERENCE
October 5-7, 2008
The Seventh North American Conference on Shaken 
Baby Syndrome/Abusive Head Trauma is being held on 
October 5-7, 2008 in beautiful Vancouver, British 
Columbia. This year, over 100 specialized experts will 
be presenting from around the world, including a strong 
legal track. 
**BC Residents** Prevent Shaken Baby Syndrome BC 
has arranged a group rate reduction for all BC 
professionals and parents. The group rate for BC 
attendees is only $150 USD for the full three days of 
training.  When registering, under Group Code enter BC 
Group Rate to receive the discounted rate. 
For more information please visit 
www.dontshake.org/conference2008
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VOICE RECOGNITION OBTAINED 
DURING ARREST PROCESS 
ADMISSIBLE
R. v. Lepage & Oliynyk, 2008 BCCA 132
Following a lengthy drug importation and 
conspiracy investigation involving 
wiretaps, both accuseds were arrested 
by police.  Lepage was arrested at a 
residence while Oliynyk was arrested at the 
Vancouver Airport. At the time of Lepage’s arrest, he 
uttered eight words in response to questions and 
statements made by the officer. This allowed the 
officer to identify his voice as one on the intercepted 
telephone calls. Oliynyk, when arrested, was warned 
and advised of his Charter right to consult 
counsel. He said he wished to telephone his lawyer, 
but police said he couldn’t until they arrived at the 
Chilliwack detachment. He was taken to a police 
vehicle for transport where he had a brief 
conversation with police officers, including asking  
who had "ratted" on him. As a result of this exchange, 
Olynyk’s arresting officer was also able to identify 
his voice as a participant in the intercepted telephone 
calls. Police then arrived at the Chilliwack detachment 
a couple of hours after the arrest. 
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court on drug 
charges, the voice identification evidence was a 
necessary component of the proof against the 
accuseds.  They argued the voice identification was 
inadmissible because their ss.7 and 10(b) Charter 
rights had been breached.  And if the voice 
identification evidence was excluded, they contended 
the case against them was insufficient to sustain a 
conviction. The Crown, on the other hand, submitted 
the evidence was properly admissible. 
The trial judge found there was nothing out of the 
ordinary concerning the arrest processes in this case 
and that the officers did not use a ruse or guise to 
obtain the voice identification evidence.  Both knew 
they were speaking to police officers and there had 
been no Charter breaches up to the point where the 
evidence of voice identification was obtained. She 
found Oliynyk willingly chose to ask questions and 
release the sound of his voice to the officer, and was 
not compelled to actively participate in the 
production of evidence or to participate in a process 
to be used against him at the direction of police. Nor 
did choosing an arresting officer familiar with 
Lepage’s telephone voice, which also would provide an 
opportunity for voice recognition or identification, 
violate his Charter rights. 
Although the trial judge concluded that Lepage’s 
rights were not breached, she did find  Oliynyk’s 
s.10(b) was violated because of the two hour delay in 
allowing him to consult counsel. In the judge’s view, 
the police could have, in a timelier manner, afforded 
him an opportunity for a private call to his lawyer by 
taking him to the Richmond detachment, which was 
closer to the airport where he was arrested, rather 
than transporting him to Chilliwack.  Oliynyk’s voice 
identification was, however, not obtained in a manner 
that infringed or denied his s.10(b) Charter right 
within the meaning of s. 24(2) because the evidence 
was obtained just on leaving the airport—there had 
not yet been a denial of his rights. The considerable 
delay in affording him access to counsel had no effect 
on obtaining the voice identification evidence since it 
was obtained within a reasonable time period before 
a proper opportunity to contact counsel could have 
been provided.  The accuseds were convicted of 
conspiracy to traffic in and import cocaine. 
The accuseds then appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing, among other grounds, that 
all evidence of voice identification obtained during 
the arrest processes should be excluded. They 
submitted the police should not to be able to utilize a 
conversation occurring at the time of arrest between 
an accused and police officers to assist in identifying 
their voices on intercepted private communications.  
Justice Hall, authoring the unanimous judgment of 
the Court, ruled that the voice identification 
evidence garnered by the police in the course of a 
normal arrest procedure was admissible. He stated:
The factual situation in the present case seems 
quite different from the circumstances existing 
in [cases where voice identification evidence had 
been obtained by deception and in breach of 
Charter rights]. Here there was no attempt by 
the police to elicit information about the crimes 
from the [accuseds], nor could there be any doubt 
on the part of these [accuseds] that they were 
conversing with police officers.  The voice 
identification evidence obtained by the arresting 
officers was obtained openly by the officers in 
the course of a normal arrest procedure. Unlike 
the situation…where an investigative procedure, a 
www.10-8.ca
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line-up, was conducted after arrest, no such 
investigative procedure occurred here.  Where 
evidence was excluded, post-arrest investigative 
procedures found to violate s. 7 or 10(b) rights of 
an accused had been employed by the police to 
obtain admissions. Where evidence is obtained by 
the police not as a result of any breach of rights 
of an accused person, as was found to be the 
factual situation by the judge in the case at bar, 
it is difficult to appreciate on what basis the 
evidence could or should be ruled to be 
inadmissible. In my opinion, the judge did not err 
in ruling the evidence of voice identification to be 
admissible.  [reference omitted, para. 36]
And although the accused Oliynyk was denied the 
right to consult counsel in a timely manner, the trial 
judge found there was no relationship between the 
breach and the obtaining of the voice identification 
evidence.  Because the breach was not causative of 
the obtaining of this evidence, the evidence was 
admissible and the accuseds appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
COMPLETE ASD DESCRIPTION 
NOT NECESSARY
R. v. Beck, 2008 BCPC 128
At an impaired driving and over 80mg% 
trial in which the accused failed a 
roadside screening test, the 
investigating police officer described 
the apparatus used as an “approved screening device”. 
When asked for a more detailed description, the 
officer said it was an Alco-Sensor IV, without 
designating a model.  Under the Approved Screening 
Devices Order seven devices are approved, two of 
which are Alco-Sensor IVs, one a model DWF and the 
other a model PWF. 
Judge Saunderson of the British Columbia Provincial 
Court found the Crown had proved that the 
investigating police officer used an approved 
screening device and therefore the “fail” reading on 
the device provided the grounds to make a 
breathalyzer demand, which resulted in readings high 
enough to support a conviction for driving with a blood 
alcohol content over 80mg%. 
A complete description of the approved screening 
device was not necessary. A less than complete 
description was sufficient as long as the court was 
satisfied an approved screening device was used, 
whether or not it was perfectly or completely 
described:
Neither a partial nor a complete description of 
the particular device is necessary for a court to 
come to that conclusion. The police officer’s 
assertion that it was an approved screening 
device, if accepted, is enough. [para. 4]
Here, the judge accepted that the device used was an 
approved screening device within the meaning of the 
Criminal Code.  
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca
APPROVED SCREENING DEVICES
Under the Approved Screening Devices Order, the 
following devices are approved for the purposes of 
s.254 of the Criminal Code: 
(a) Alcolmeter S-L2; 
(b) Alco-Sûr; 
(c) Alcotest(R) 7410 PA3; 
(d) Alcotest® 7410 GLC; 
(e) Alco-Sensor IV DWF; 
(f) Alco-Sensor IV PWF; and 
(g) Intoxilyzer 400D. 
Legally Speaking:
Right to Silence
“The common law recognizes an 
individual’s right to remain silent, but the 
right to remain silent does not include or 
extend to the right not to be spoken to by 
state authorities. Likewise, the right to 
silence contained within the s. 7 Charter guarantee does not 
prohibit police from questioning a detainee. Police 
persuasion, which falls short of denying the detainee the right 
to choose or of depriving him or her of an operating mind, 
does not breach the right to silence.” - Ontario Court of 
Appeal Justice Watt, R. v. Rybak, 2008 ONCA 354, 
references omitted, para. 189
Note-able Quote
“A moment's insight is sometimes worth a life's 
experience.” - Oliver Wendell Holmes
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SUPREME COURT NEUTERS 
RANDOM DOG SNIFF AT BUS 
DEPOT
R. v. Kang-Brown, 2008 SCC 18
A three member plain clothes police 
team, along with a sniffer dog, was 
patrolling a Greyhound bus terminal as 
part of a Jetway project, a program 
which monitors the public for drugs, weapons, 
proceeds of crime, or other contraband at airports, 
bus depots, or train stations. The accused was 
observed disembark from an over-night bus from 
Vancouver to Calgary carrying a bag high over his 
shoulder. This behaviour, in combination with an 
elongated stare, rubbernecking, and an odd circling of 
the bus, drew the officer’s attention and he entered 
into a conversation with the accused. 
During the conversation the officer learned the 
accused purchased his ticket last minute. He 
attempted to obtain consent to search the bag and as 
the officer was about to touch it, but the accused 
pulled it away and appeared agitated, panicked, antsy, 
and fidgety. The officer signalled for a police dog 
handler to bring over Chevy, a dog trained in 
detecting illegal drug odours with a track record of 
90 to 92 percent accuracy. The dog immediately 
indicated the presence of drugs in the bag, which had 
been placed on the ground. The accused was arrested 
and 17 ounces of cocaine was found in the bag as was 
a small amount of heroin in his clothing. 
 
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench the 
accused sought exclusion of the evidence under 
s.24(2) of the Charter because, he argued, the police 
violated his right, among others, to be secure against 
unreasonable search and seizure. He submitted that 
the dog sniff was a warrantless search and was 
therefore unreasonable. The trial judge concluded 
that the odour emanating from the bag voluntarily 
brought into a public transportation facility was not 
information in which the accused had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. 
He unsuccessfully appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal arguing the actions of the police dog amounted 
to a search protected under the Charter. Justice 
Cote, authoring the majority opinion of the Court, 
concluded not every government examination will 
intrude upon a reasonable expectation of privacy and 
thereby amount to a search. He found that not all 
information gleaned by the police in a public place 
about the contents of a private place is a search. He 
ruled there was no search and therefore no s.8 
breach. Furthermore, even if the dog sniff was a 
search, Justice Cote held the evidence would be 
admissible under s.24(2). The majority dismissed the 
accused’s appeal and his conviction was affirmed. 
Justice Paperny, on the other hand, disagreed with 
the majority. In her dissenting opinion she concluded 
that the police did violate the accused’s rights under 
s.8, would have excluded the evidence under s.24(2), 
and entered an acquittal.
The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada, which needed to determine whether he had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy thereby making the 
use of the sniffer dog a search. And if there was a 
search, whether it was unreasonable, and if it was 
unreasonable, whether the trial judge erred in not 
excluding the evidence under s.24(2). 
Was there a Search?
All nine judges agreed that there was a search. A 
search for constitutional purposes occurs when the 
state intrudes upon a person’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy. Justice Binnie (with Chief Justice 
McLachlin concurring) found the use of the dog a 
search “because of the significance and quality of the 
information obtained about concealed contents.” 
Justice Deschamps concluded the accused showed he 
had a subjective expectation of privacy because he 
held the bag close to his body and made it clear to 
police—both verbally and physically—that he wanted 
to control access to it. Objectively, the dog alert 
“allowed for a strong, immediate and direct inference 
to be made about the contents of the [accused’s] bag, 
and this involved a certain intrusion on informational 
privacy.” She continued:
The right to informational privacy protects 
biographical information, including the very nature 
of the information. In a case involving this right, the 
relevant elements of informational privacy include 
intimate personal details about an accused, such as 
his or her having come into contact with a controlled 
substance either as a drug trafficker, an illegal drug 
user or a legal drug user (such as a user of marijuana 
for medicinal purposes), or by being in the company 
of drug users. The very personal nature of this 
www.10-8.ca
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information suggests that the [accused] had an 
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.
Other factors also indicate that the [accused] had 
an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. He 
owned and used the bag, he was present at the time 
of the search, the bag was one that could be carried 
close to the body, and he did not abandon it or leave 
it unattended. The conduct of the police in this case 
also intruded to a certain extent on the [accused’s] 
right to territorial privacy: members of the public 
have historically used bus terminals to travel as a 
means of exercising their freedom of mobility, 
security screening was not done routinely in this 
terminal and there were no signs indicating that a 
luggage search was possible. [paras. 175-176]
However, she also recognized that the privacy 
interest was low. The search here was conducted in a 
public place, not a private residence nor a workplace, 
and the search technique used was minimally 
intrusive. Similarly, Justice Bastarache stated:
In my view, the circumstances of this case 
support a finding that the [accused] had a 
reasonable, but limited, expectation of privacy in 
his luggage at the time the dog sniff occurred. A 
subjective expectation of privacy is evidenced by 
the protective manner in which the [accused] 
carried his bag and his refusal to allow a voluntary 
search to occur. From an objective perspective, it 
is significant that the odour 
identified by the dog was not 
accessible to humans and 
that its detection provided 
immediate information about 
the contents of the 
[accused’s] luggage.   This 
Court has held that 
informational privacy 
protects “a biographical core 
of personal information 
which individuals in a free and democratic society 
would wish to maintain and control from 
dissemination to the state.  This would include 
information which tends to reveal intimate details 
of the lifestyle and personal choices of the 
individual”. The information collected about the 
contents of the [accused’s] bag falls within this 
biographical core, and both a subjective and 
objective expectation of privacy have thus been 
established. [reference omitted, para. 227] 
Justice Bastarache also found the privacy 
expectation at the bus depot was significantly 
reduced and compared  it to that associated with 
border crossings, where the state has an interest in 
fighting illegal activity when travelers transport 
their belongings. Similarly, at airports passengers 
voluntarily use the terminal to access public 
transportation and the state has an interest in 
ensuring it is both secure and not used for criminal 
activity. 
Since the search in this case was not authorized by 
statute, the court examined whether it was 
authorized at common law and if it was, what the 
required legal standard would be needed to trigger 
the power. 
What’s the Appropriate Standard?
In the fragmented judgment, three separate legal 
standards were examined: reasonable and probable 
cause, reasonable suspicion, and generalized 
suspicion. 
Reasonable and probable cause (or  reasonable 
grounds to believe) is the standard generally required 
for searches and seizures under Canadian law.  
Reasonable suspicion (or reasonable grounds to 
suspect) is a lower standard than reasonable and 
probable cause. Justice Binnie described this 
standard as “something more than a mere suspicion 
and something less than a belief based upon 
reasonable and probable grounds.” Justice 
Deschamps noted this standard has been 
equated to an articulable cause (but a 
mere hunch would be insufficient) and, in 
determining whether the standard is met, 
the totality of the circumstances must be 
considered. She stated:
The reasonable suspicion standard is lower 
than the standard of reasonable grounds to 
believe required for a lawful arrest. To meet the 
reasonable suspicion standard, the police must rely 
on “a constellation of objectively discernible facts”. 
While no single factor can on its own ground 
reasonable suspicion, a number of factors taken 
together may cause the police to entertain a 
reasonable suspicion. However, a mere “hunch based 
on intuition gained by experience” is not enough to 
meet the reasonable suspicion standard. 
[references omitted, para. 165]
Justice Deschamps opined that this intermediate 
standard was justifiable because of the lower 
expectation of privacy and the use of the dog was a 
“From an objective perspective, it 
is significant that the odour 
identified by the dog was not 
accessible to humans and that its 
detection provided immediate 
information about the contents of 
the [accused’s] luggage.”
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minimally intrusive investigative tool—it occurred in a 
public place, could only detect drugs, was not random, 
and was used as a last resort in a progressing 
investigation. 
A generalized suspicion, as Justice Bastarache 
explained, does not require a reasonable or 
individualized suspicion related to a particular person, 
but rather it relates to a particular place or event. In 
his view, random searches could be appropriate on the 
basis of a generalized suspicion that drugs were likely 
on the premises. This search power would not only 
serve to detect crime, but to prevent and deter it.  
The Case for Reasonable and Probable 
Grounds
Four judges (Justice Lebel with Justices Fish, Abella, 
and Charron concurring) refused to lower the 
threshold for the use of a drug sniffing dog from the 
general standard in search and seizure law of 
reasonable and probable grounds. They decided that 
the appropriate standard for the use of a dog was not 
the downgraded standard of reasonable suspicion, nor 
the even looser test of generalized suspicion. These 
judges declined to craft new common law rules 
reducing the standard and found police investigative 
powers arising from the use of dogs 
were better left for Parliament to 
establish a proper statutory 
framework. They concluded the 
police breached the accused’s s.8 
Charter rights and found the 
evidence inadmissible under 
s.24(2). They would allow the appeal 
and set aside the conviction. 
Two other judges commented that 
if the police already had reasonable 
grounds to believe contraband was present as these 
four judges required, the use of the sniffer dogs 
would have been superfluous and unnecessary while 
another two observed their use would only expedite a 
more intrusive search.
The Case for Reasonable Suspicion
Four judges found that all the police required was a 
reasonable suspicion to conduct this search at 
common law. In Justice Binnie’s view (with Chief 
Justice McLachlin concurring), the police were 
entitled to call in the aid of sniffer dogs where they 
have reasonable grounds to suspect the presence of 
contraband:
Where reasonable suspicion exists, a sniffer-dog 
search is authorized by the common law, and the 
common law itself is reasonable on the basis of 
reasonable suspicion, given the minimally intrusive, 
narrowly targeted and high accuracy of “sniff 
searches” by dogs with a proven track record like 
Chevy. [para. 60]
However, two of these four judges favouring a 
reasonable suspicion standard ruled the police did not 
meet the required standard, while the other two 
agreed they had. Justice Binnie concluded the search 
was not authorized by law nor was it conducted 
reasonably. Rather than conducting the search on the 
basis of objectively verifiable evidence supporting a 
reasonable suspicion, the police were acting merely on 
speculation and initiated the warrantless search on 
inadequate grounds. Since the sniff search was 
conducted without reasonable suspicion, the alert did 
not provide valid grounds for the arrest. However, 
Justice Binnie noted, if there was a reasonable 
suspicion for the sniff, the positive alert by Chevy, in 
light of his accuracy, would have given the police 
grounds to proceed with an on-the-spot warrantless 
verification search of the accused’s bag. Then, after 
the hand search confirmed the 
presence of drugs, an arrest could 
follow. An arrest prior to this hand 
search would have been premature 
Justice Binnie said. 
As for the admissibility of evidence, 
Justice Binnie found it should have 
been excluded. Although the drugs 
were non-conscriptive evidence, the 
administration of justice would have 
been brought into disrepute if the 
evidence was admitted. The police lacked the 
reasonable suspicion required for the exercise of this 
“exceptional power” in the absence of prior judicial 
authorization. Further, although drug trafficking is a 
serious matter so too are the constitutional rights of 
the travelling public. 
The other two judges favouring a reasonable 
suspicion standard (Justice Deschamps with Justice 
Rothstein concurring) held the police met the 
necessary reasonable suspicion standard to justify 
the search. Justice Deschamps found the trial judge 
“The reasonable suspicion 
standard is lower than the 
standard of reasonable grounds to 
believe required for a lawful arrest. 
... However, a mere “hunch based 
on intuition gained by experience” 
is not enough to meet the 
reasonable suspicion standard.”
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properly considered a global view of the facts, or 
totality of the circumstances, in concluding the 
experienced and trained officer had met the 
requisite standard. She was critical of Justice 
Binnie’s approach in deconstructing “the evidence in 
microscopic detail, piece by piece and stage by stage”. 
“Breaking the conduct of the police down by stages to 
determine whether each piece of evidence is relevant 
or probative instead of considering the evidence as a 
whole as it naturally unfolded results in an artificial 
analysis,” she said. “In my view, this recasting of the 
facts neither accurately nor fairly reflects the 
totality of the facts and circumstances confronted 
by the police in this case.”
As well, Justice Deschamps found the search was 
conducted in a reasonable manner. The dog passively 
indicated by sitting down. Once the dog alerted, the 
positive indication provided reasonable grounds to 
make the arrest and then search the bag by hand 
incidental to that arrest. There was no Charter 
breach and therefore no reason to enter into a 
s.24(2) enquiry.    
The Case for Generalized Suspicion
Justice Bastarache agreed with Justices Binnie and 
Deschamps that the common law allows for the use of 
sniffer dogs on the basis of a reasonable suspicion, 
but also in some cases, such as public bus terminals or 
schools, that a generalized suspicion is all that’s 
required. Rather than requiring a reasonable suspicion 
relating to a specific individual, as the police had 
here, it would have also been appropriate for them to 
randomly search the luggage of all bus depot 
passengers if the police had a reasonable suspicion 
that drug activity might be occurring at the terminal 
and reasonable informed passengers were aware that 
their baggage may be subject to a sniffer-dog search. 
He stated:
In my view, it is, in some circumstances, 
appropriate for police to conduct random 
searches using sniffer dogs on the basis of 
generalized suspicion.  Allowing this type of 
search recognizes the important role sniffer 
dogs can play not only in detecting crime but also 
in preventing and deterring crime.  Given the 
accuracy and efficiency of sniffer-dog searches, 
it is reasonable to conclude that their known 
presence, or potential presence, at particular 
locations would have a significant preventative 
effect.  Allowing random searches in certain 
situations also has the benefit of avoiding 
inappropriate profiling and reducing any 
embarrassment which may be associated with a 
targeted search… [para. 246]
In this case, it was unnecessary for Justice 
Bastarache to determine whether the use of the 
sniffer dog in this case was reasonable on the basis 
of a generalized suspicion because he found the police 
had a reasonable (individualized) suspicion. He also 
found the search was minimally intrusive. The dog did 
not touch the accused or even sniff him. She did not 
bark, was not aggressive, and was only interested in 
the bag. The alert was also subdued. The dog simply 
sat down. The alert was immediate. It did not take 
long nor create an inconvenience for the accused. The 
only personal information revealed was the presence 
or absence of one of the nine drugs the dog was 
trained to detect. The dog did not interfere with the 
accused’s bodily integrity in any way. And no stigma 
was attached to having a bag sniffed at a bus depot. 
The accused was not frisked, nor was his bag opened 
and searched. It was not an embarrassing process. 
Final Result
In the end, six of the nine judges would have excluded 
the evidence, while three would have allowed it. Thus 
the accused’s appeal was allowed and his conviction 
was overturned. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
Reasonable 
grounds to 
suspect
Reasonable 
grounds to 
believe
Reasonable grounds to suspect, or reasonable 
suspicion, is a lesser but included standard of 
reasonable grounds to believe. 
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RANDOM SCHOOL SEARCH WITH 
DRUG DETECTION DOG 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
R. v. A.M., 2008 SCC 19
A high school principal, concerned about 
the presence of drugs in his school, had 
offered a standing invitation for police 
to bring drug detector dogs into the 
school. Two years later three police officers with a 
dog arrived at the school one morning and told the 
principal they wanted permission to go through the 
school, which was immediately granted. After 
students were instructed to remain in their 
classrooms, the police randomly searched the school. 
In a gymnasium the dog alerted on one of several 
unattended backpacks lying next to a wall. An officer 
looked through the contents of the backpack and 
found 10 bags of marihuana, 10 “magic mushrooms”, a 
pipe, lighter, rolling papers, and a roach clip. As well, 
the accused’s wallet and identification were in the 
backpack. He was charged with possession of 
marihuana and psilocybin for the purpose of 
trafficking.
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the judge 
concluded there were two searches: one using the 
drug dog and the other being the physical search of 
the backpack. He also found the search was a police 
search disguised as a school search and there were no 
reasonable grounds to believe drugs would be found. 
Both searches were unreasonable and the evidence 
was excluded under s.24(2).
The Crown appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
arguing, in part, that the police were in fact acting as 
agents of the school, that the dog sniff was not a 
search (but if it was it was reasonable), and that the 
physical search of the backpack was reasonable. 
Justice Armstrong, authoring the unanimous 
judgment, ruled that the search was a police search. 
The police had not been requested by any school 
authority that day, had not given notice of their 
intention to search, and neither the principal nor any 
teacher played an active role in it. “The fact that 
some two years earlier the school principal had issued 
a standing invitation to the police to search the school 
with the assistance of a sniffer dog does not ... turn 
the search … into a search by school authorities in 
police uniforms,” he said. 
R. v. Kang-Brown judgment grid
Judge(s) Was there 
a search?
Is there common 
law authority to 
use a sniffer dog to 
search?
What is the minimum 
standard required to 
justify the search?
Was the 
standard 
reached?
Was s.8 
breached?
Should the 
evidence be 
excluded 
under s.24(2)?
Lebel
Fish
Abella
Charron
Yes No Reasonable and probable 
grounds
No Yes Yes
McLachlin
Binnie
Yes Yes Reasonable suspicion No Yes Yes
Deschamps
Rothstein
Yes Yes Reasonable suspicion Yes No Not necessary 
to determine
Bastarache Yes Yes Reasonable suspicion, 
and in some cases a 
generalized suspicion
Yes No Not necessary 
to determine
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Justice Armstrong found it unnecessary to decide 
whether the dog sniff alone amounted to a search. 
Rather, he concluded that both the sniff and 
backpack search engaged s.8 of the Charter. 
Students have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the contents of their backpacks, much like an adult’s 
privacy in the contents of a briefcase. Students 
backpacks are not searched during the normal course 
of a school day nor do they expect their backpacks to 
be searched. The dog was a physical extension of its 
handler and was connected to the physical search of 
the backpack. Since the search was warrantless it 
was prima facie unreasonable and the Crown could not 
rebut this presumption. Further, the search was 
randomly conducted with the entire student body 
held in detention. The evidence was inadmissible and 
the appeal was dismissed.
The Crown then appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada where the justices had to determine whether 
the accused’s rights under s. 8 of the Charter were 
breached and whether the evidence was properly 
excluded at trial.
Was there a search?
Most judges agreed there was a search in this case, 
but not all. Seven judges concluded there was a 
search since the accused had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the contents of his back-
pack. Justice Binnie explained that the positive alert 
led immediately to the warrantless physical 
examination of the contents of the backpack. As part 
of his privacy analysis he stated:
The backpacks from which the 
odour emanated here belonged 
to various members of the 
student body including the 
accused.  As with briefcases, 
purses and suitcases, backpacks 
are the repository of much that 
is personal, particularly for 
people who lead itinerant 
lifestyles during the day as in 
the case of students and 
travellers.  No doubt ordinary 
businessmen and businesswomen 
riding along on public transit or 
going up and down on elevators in 
office towers would be outraged 
at any suggestion that the 
contents of their briefcases 
could randomly be inspected by the police without 
“reasonable suspicion” of illegality.   Because of 
their role in the lives of students, backpacks 
objectively command a measure of privacy.
As the accused did not testify, the question of 
whether or not he had a subjective expectation of 
privacy in his backpack must be inferred from the 
circumstances.  While teenagers may have little 
expectation of privacy from the searching eyes 
and fingers of their parents, I think it obvious 
that they expect the contents of their backpacks 
not to be open to the random and speculative 
scrutiny of the police.  This expectation is a 
reasonable one that society should support. [paras. 
62-63]
Although a student’s expectation of privacy is 
lessened in a school setting, it nonetheless existed 
and was not abandoned when the students left their 
backpacks in the gymnasium as they were directed to 
their classrooms.  The dog sniff also permitted an 
inference about the precise contents of its source. 
The information was specific and meaningful about 
contents concealed in an enclosed place in which the 
accused had a continuing expectation of privacy and 
was intended to be kept private, unlike a FLIR image 
which only showed that activities in a house 
generated heat or electricity records that were 
known to third parties. “By use of the dog, the 
policeman could ‘see’ through the concealing fabric of 
the backpack,” said Justice Binnie. The Crown’s 
further argument that there can be no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in contraband was not 
accepted. The sniff of the backpack was therefore a 
search. 
Justice Bastarache also found the 
accused had a reasonable, but 
significantly diminished, expectation 
of privacy in his backpack when it 
was sniffed. Subjectively, student 
backpacks frequently contain 
personal items they wish to keep 
private.   Objectively, the odour 
detected by the dog sniff was not 
accessible to humans and its 
detection provided immediate 
information about the contents of 
the backpack, thus revealing a 
“biographical core of personal 
information” about the accused and 
his personal choices that would 
“The backpacks from which the 
odour emanated here belonged to 
various members of the student 
body including the accused. As 
with briefcases, purses and 
suitcases, backpacks are the 
repository of much that is 
personal, particularly for people 
who lead itinerant lifestyles during 
the day as in the case of students 
and travellers. ...  Because of their 
role in the lives of students, 
backpacks objectively command a 
measure of privacy.”
www.10-8.ca12
Volume 8 Issue 3
May/June 2008
otherwise have been kept secret from the state. Nor 
is an individual required to be physically in possession 
of an object to have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in it.
Justice Deschamps (with Justice Rothstein 
concurring) found the dog sniff from an empirical 
perspective may have been a search (the positive 
indication enabled the police to ascertain what was 
inside the backpack with a high degree of accuracy) 
but it was not a search from a constitutional 
perspective. The accused did not have a subjective 
expectation of privacy. Students and parents were 
aware of a drug problem and that a zero tolerance 
policy on drugs was in affect and also knew sniffer 
dogs might be used. Nor was the expectation of 
privacy objectively reasonable. The place where the 
search occurred was a school with a known drug 
problem. It involved an unattended backpack and was 
a non-personal search. And the accused was not 
present when the backpack was searched. It was in 
plain view and was neither worn nor carried by him. 
The investigative technique was also relatively non-
intrusive. The drugs could be detected without 
opening the backpack and could not convey any 
information other than their presence. Justice 
Deschamps concluded that the use of the dog did not 
intrude upon a reasonably held privacy interest and 
therefore s.8 was not engaged, there was no need for 
police to have individualized grounds for the dog 
sniff, and there was no need to determine whether 
the search was reasonable or whether s.24(2) applied.
Was the Search Reasonable?
The warrantless search was presumptively 
unreasonable unless it met the requirements of being 
authorized by a reasonable law and conducted in a 
reasonable manner. 
Justice Lebel (with Justices Fish, Abella, and Charron 
concurring) ruled the search was neither justified by 
statute nor common law. The police were not using the 
dog to narrow a search under the authority of a 
warrant. Nor was it being carried out by school 
authorities on the basis of a reasonable suspicion. As 
for the common law, the four judges refused to 
create a legal framework for the general use of drug 
sniffing dogs. In their view, the accused’s s.8 Charter 
right was violated and the evidence was properly 
excluded under s.24(2).
Jutsice Binnie (with Chief Justice McLachlin 
concurring) concluded the police had a common law 
power to use the sniffer dog as part of their duty to 
investigate crime and bring perpetrators to justice. 
However, this common law power is subject to 
Charter compliance. But because the dog sniff was 
minimally intrusive and tightly targeted (alerts only 
to contraband drugs with a high degree of accuracy), 
the reasonable and probable grounds standard was 
not required. If it were the required standard, the 
police would already have enough to get a warrant for 
a physical search without the sniffer dog 
confirmation and there would be no need to deploy it. 
Instead, the police were entitled to use sniffer dogs 
on the basis of a reasonable suspicion in the context 
of a routine criminal investigation. A reasonable 
suspicion requires a subjective belief backed by 
objectively verifiable indications—a reasonably well 
educated guess is not sufficient. This lower standard 
is appropriate because a properly conducted search 
requires no physical contact with the person or object 
sniffed, the sniff discloses only the presence of 
illegal drugs (or not), and as in this case, the dog had 
an enviable record of accuracy. 
Further, the police do not have to get prior 
authorization provided they are already lawfully 
present when the search occurs. And “if the sniff is 
conducted on the basis of reasonable suspicion and 
discloses the presence of illegal drugs on the person 
or in a backpack or other place of concealment, the 
police may…confirm the accuracy of that information 
with a physical search, again without prior judicial 
authorization.” Without this minimal standard of 
reasonable suspicion, the use of the dog will breach 
s.8.  In this case, Justice Binnie agreed with the trial 
judge that this search was a random speculative one, 
not based on reasonable suspicion, and the evidence 
was properly excluded. 
As a note, Justice Binnie ruled the accused had not 
been unlawfully detained under s.9 of the Charter 
when the principal instructed all students over the 
public address system to remain in their classrooms 
during the police search of the school. The principal’s 
announcement was for the purpose of maintaining 
order and discipline under Ontario’s Education Act. 
Justice Bastarache viewed the drug sniff as falling 
within the police powers of preserving the peace and 
preventing crime—identifying individuals carrying 
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illegal drugs to ensure a safe school environment. 
These types of searches are also minimally intrusive. 
They are expedient, cause minimal inconvenience, and 
only the presence or absence of drugs is revealed in 
a non-threatening manner. The accused was also not 
present when the search occurred, there was no 
interference with his bodily integrity, and this was 
neither an embarrassing or humiliating encounter. 
In balancing a student’s privacy interests with the 
public’s interest in preventing and deterring the 
presence of drugs in schools, Justice Bastarache 
found schools are an environment in which it is 
appropriate to base random searches of bags on a 
lower standard of a generalized suspicion, provided 
reasonably informed members of the public would be 
aware random searches may be used. There is no need 
for an individualized suspicion about a particular 
student.  However, unlike an airport, bus, or train 
depot where there is a generalized, ongoing suspicion 
about drug activities, Justice Bastarache was not 
prepared to accept that this conclusion applies to all 
schools. Rather, the random use of sniffer dogs at a 
school requires a suspicion that “drugs will be located 
at that specific location at the specific time the 
search is being performed.” 
In this case the police were not acting on a current 
reasonable suspicion drugs were present. Although 
the principal was concerned about drugs at the 
school, his concern was insufficient to justify the 
random searches. Thus, the absence of a generalized 
suspicion resulted in a s.8 Charter breach. The 
evidence, in Justice Bastarache’s view, was 
nevertheless admissible. It was non-conscriptive and 
the Charter breach was not serious. The search 
occurred where there was a diminished expectation 
of privacy and the breach was neither deliberate nor 
willful. The constitutional violation was inadvertent 
and police acted in good faith. Trafficking is a serious 
crime and the evidence was crucial to the Crown’s 
case. Its exclusion, not its admission, would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. 
Final Result
In the end, six of the nine judges would have excluded 
the evidence, while three would have allowed it. Thus 
the Crown’s appeal was dismissed and the accused’s 
acquittal was upheld. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
R. v. A.M. judgment grid
Judge(s) Was there 
a search?
Is there common 
law authority to 
use a sniffer dog to 
search?
What is the minimum 
standard required to 
justify the search?
Was the 
standard 
reached?
Was s.8 
breached?
Should the 
evidence be 
excluded 
under s.24(2)?
Lebel
Fish
Abella
Charron
Yes No Reasonable and probable 
grounds
No Yes Yes
McLachlin
Binnie
Yes Yes Reasonable suspicion No Yes Yes
Bastarache Yes Yes Reasonable suspicion, 
and in some cases a 
generalized suspicion
No Yes No
Deschamps
Rothstein
No Yes 
(see Kang-Brown)
Reasonable suspicion 
(see Kang-Brown)
Not 
necessary 
to answer 
since 
there was 
no search
Not 
necessary 
to answer 
since 
there was 
no search
Not necessary 
to answer 
since there 
was no search
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CROWN MUST PROVE NECESSARY 
GROUNDS FOR BREATH DEMAND 
IN CHARTER CHALLENGE
R. v. Gundy, 2008 ONCA 284
A police officer working an evening 
R.I.D.E. campaign stopped a truck driven 
by the accused. The accused said she had 
two glasses of wine, her eyes were 
bloodshot, she had difficulty finding her licence, and 
smelled of alcohol.  The officer made a demand that 
she forthwith provide a sample of her breath into an 
approved screening device. Following a “demo” of the 
device by the officer, the accused blew into it and 
registered a fail. The results of the test caused the 
officer to form the grounds for believing the accused 
had committed an over 80mg% offence.  The accused 
was arrested and the Intoxilizer breath demand was 
read. Once back at the police detachment she spoke 
to a lawyer and then complied with the breath 
demand, providing two sample ( 217mg% and 
207mg%).  
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the accused 
argued, among other grounds, that the officer did not 
have reasonable and probable grounds to make the 
Intoxilizer demand because the Crown failed to prove 
that the device used was an approved screening 
device.  The trial judge ruled that the officer 
referred to the device she used by name, an Alcotest, 
which is an approved screening device. She also 
testified she demanded a sample of breath as 
required for analysis by an “approved screening 
device”. And the Intoxilizer operator said she 
received the grounds for the demand based upon the 
arresting officer administering a screening test with 
“an approved screening device”. Based upon the 
evidence, the trial judge was satisfied an approved 
screening device was used and that there were proper 
grounds to make the demand for a breath sample. She 
was convicted of over 80mg% contrary to s. 253(b) of 
the Criminal Code.   
The accused appealed her conviction to the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice. The appeal judge 
concluded the evidence showed an approved screening 
device was used thus rendering the grounds proper to 
make the Intoxilzer demand. The appeal was, 
however, allowed on a different ground and a new trial 
was ordered. The accused then appealed the trial 
judge’s order of a new trial, instead submitting that 
an acquittal should have been entered. 
 
The Ontario Court of Appeal was again required to 
determine, in part, what the Crown must prove in 
showing that the investigating officer made a valid 
breathalyzer demand under s.254(3) where the 
grounds for the demand depend upon the results of 
an approved screening device test. In answering this 
question, there were two issues arising regarding 
reasonable and probable grounds; the admissibility of 
the breathalyzer results under the Criminal Code and 
the impact of s.8 of the Charter.
Criminal Code Admissibility
Under the Criminal Code the breathalyzer results are 
admissible by certificate (s.258(1)(g)) or through viva 
voce evidence and the Crown is also able to rely on the 
presumption that evidence of the results of the 
analysis is proof of the concentration of alcohol in the 
blood of the accused. The admissibility of the 
certificate under ss.258(1)(c) or (g), however, does 
not require proof of reasonable and probable grounds. 
The absence of reasonable and probable grounds may 
afford a defence to a charge of refusing to submit to 
a breathalyzer, but is not relevant and does not 
affect the admissibility of the certificate if the 
demand was acceded to. Thus, absent a Charter 
challenge to the admissibility of the results, the 
prosecution need not establish that the officer had 
reasonable and probable grounds for the demand. 
Justice Rosenberg stated:
If the accused does not challenge the admissibility of 
the results of the Intoxilizer/Breathalyzer analysis 
on the basis that the accused’s rights under the 
Charter were violated, the Crown is not required to 
establish that the officer had reasonable and 
probable grounds to make the s. 254(3) demand.
Any objection to the admissibility of the results of 
the analysis should ordinarily be made, at the latest, 
when the Crown tenders the evidence either through 
a certificate under s. 258(1)(g) or by way of oral 
testimony. [para. 50]
s.8 Charter Admissibilty
Justice Rosenberg concluded that the burden is on 
the Crown to establish the requisite grounds if the 
accused objects to the admissibility of the results of 
the analysis pursuant to ss. 8 and 24(2) of the 
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Charter on the basis that the officer lacked 
reasonable and probable grounds to make the demand. 
In other words, it is for the prosecution to prove 
reasonable and probable grounds existed and not the 
accused to prove they didn’t exist: 
The taking of breath samples is a warrantless 
seizure.  A minimum constitutional requirement for 
a valid seizure within the meaning of s. 8 of the 
Charter is that the seizure was authorized by law. 
A lawful seizure of breath samples requires that 
the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to 
believe that the motorist committed an offence 
under s. 253. Accordingly, if a police officer took 
breath samples from a motorist in circumstances 
where the officer did not have reasonable and 
probable grounds, the seizure would be unlawful and 
violate s. 8 of the Charter and the evidence 
obtained would potentially be inadmissible under 
s. 24(2). [references omitted, para. 30]
If an accused is able to establish on the balance of 
probabilities that the taking of breath samples 
infringed his Charter rights (because Crown failed to 
show the requisite reasonable and probable grounds 
for making the breathalyzer demand) the 
breathalyzer evidence might well be excluded if the 
admission of those breathalyzer results would bring 
the administration of justice into disrepute. 
If an officer forms his reasonable and probable 
grounds to make an Intoxilizer demand from the 
results of an approved screening device, there is both 
a subjective and objective component.  The officer 
must subjectively have an honest belief that the 
suspect has committed the offence and, objectively, 
there must exist reasonable grounds for this 
belief.  It is not sufficient for the officer to 
personally believe that they have reasonable and 
probable grounds. It must also be objectively 
established that those reasonable and probable 
grounds did in fact exist—a reasonable person, 
standing in the shoes of the police officer, would have 
believed that reasonable and probable grounds 
existed. And where the officer is aware that the 
results of the approved screening device are 
unreliable because of the circumstances in which the 
test was administered, then the officer cannot have 
the requisite subjective belief.  However, the officer 
is entitled to rely on an approved screening device’s 
accuracy unless there is credible evidence to the 
contrary. Justice Rosenberg explained further:
Note that it is the reasonable and probable grounds 
that must be shown to exist.  It may turn out that, 
in fact, the motorist’s ability to drive was not 
impaired or that the motorist’s blood alcohol level 
did not exceed the legal limit.  The question is 
whether a reasonable person with the same 
information as the officer would have concluded 
that there were reasonable and probable grounds to 
believe an offence had been committed. Thus, if the 
device used by the officer was not in fact an 
approved screening device, the objective 
component may or may not be made out; it depends 
upon whether the officer could reasonably believe 
that the device he or she was using was an approved 
device. [para. 43] 
And:
In determining whether the particular device was 
approved, the court must consider all the evidence, 
including any circumstantial evidence. The court is 
entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the 
evidence.  Thus, in my view, if the officer in his or 
her testimony refers to the device as an “approved 
Criminal Code Presumptions of Identity and Accuracy
s.258(1)(c) Presumption of identity samples of the breath taken pursuant to a demand under s. 
254(3), if taken as soon as practicable and, in the case of 
the first sample, not later than two hours after the offence is  
proof that the concentration of alcohol in the blood  at the 
time when the offence was committed 
s.258(1)(g) Presumption of accuracy a certificate of a qualified technician stating the analysis of 
the samples made by means of an approved instrument in 
proper working order operated by the technician is 
evidence of the facts in the certificate.
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screening device”, the trial judge is entitled to infer 
that the device was indeed an approved device.  As 
such, the officer is entitled to 
rely upon the “fail” recorded by 
the device to find that there were 
reasonable and probable grounds 
to make the breath demand.  
The officer is not required to 
refer to the device by its 
particular brand and number such 
as “Alcotest 7410 GLC”. Further, 
references to a part only of the 
identification such as “Alcotest” 
or “Alcotest GLC” do not rebut 
the reasonable inference from the officer’s 
reference to the device as approved that it is 
indeed an approved screening device. The addition 
of the manufacturer’s name, for example “Drager 
Alcotest 7410 GLC”, is likewise not fatal. Further, 
in my view, the context in which the officer refers 
to the device as approved is of no particular 
moment. Thus, if the officer testifies that he or 
she used an approved screening device, or agrees 
with the suggestion that it is an approved screening 
device, such testimony is direct evidence upon which 
the trial judge can rely. [references omitted, paras. 
45-46]
In this case, the judge was not confined to direct 
evidence and could reasonably infer the officer used 
an approved device because she 
said she made a demand for the 
motorist to provide a sample for 
analysis by an approved 
screening device. In Justice 
Armstrong’s view, it is not 
reasonable to infer that an 
officer who says that they used 
an approved screening device 
actually used an unapproved 
one.  Furthermore, even if the 
Crown is unable to establish 
that the officer had the 
requisite reasonable and 
probable grounds and therefore 
an accused’s s.8 rights have 
been shown to be violated, exclusion of the results of 
the Intoxilizer is not automatic.  The accused must 
still establish that admission of the evidence would 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute 
under s.24(2). Justice Rosenberg summarized the 
Charter argument analysis as follows:
Where the accused objects to the admissibility of 
the results of the analysis pursuant to ss. 8 and 
24(2) of the Charter that the 
officer lacked reasonable and 
probable grounds to make the 
demand, the burden is on the 
Crown to establish the requisite 
grounds.
Reasonable and probable grounds 
involve an objective and subjective 
test.   Where the grounds depend 
upon a “fail” from an approved 
screening device, the Crown must 
prove that the officer reasonably 
believed that he or she was using an approved device.
In the absence of credible evidence to the 
contrary, the officer’s testimony that he or she 
made a demand with an approved screening device is 
sufficient evidence that the officer had the 
requisite reasonable belief.   The officer is not 
required to give the particular model number or 
otherwise identify the device.  Obvious errors such 
as incomplete reference to the model number do not 
undermine the officer’s testimony that the device 
was an approved screening device.
Where the officer did not have the requisite 
reasonable and probable grounds, the warrantless 
seizure of breath samples for analysis in an 
Intoxilizer or breathalyzer is an unreasonable 
seizure within the meaning of s. 8 and 
the results may be excluded under s. 
24(2) of the Charter. [para. 50]
Here, the Crown established that 
the officer used an approved 
screening device.  The officer’s 
reference to an “Alcotest” did not 
undermine her direct evidence that 
she used an approved screening 
device and she therefore had 
reasonable and probable grounds to 
make the Intoxilizer demand and 
there was no violation of s.8 of the 
Charter. The accused’s appeal 
seeking an acquittal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“Reasonable and probable 
grounds involve an objective and 
subjective test.  ... Where the 
officer did not have the requisite 
reasonable and probable grounds, 
the warrantless seizure of breath 
samples for analysis in an 
Intoxilizer or breathalyzer is an 
unreasonable seizure within the 
meaning of s. 8 and the results 
may be excluded under s. 24(2) of 
the Charter.”
“Where the accused objects to the 
admissibility of the results of the 
analysis pursuant to ss. 8 and 
24(2) of the Charter that the officer 
lacked reasonable and probable 
grounds to make the demand, the 
burden is on the Crown to 
establish the requisite grounds.”
Latin Legal Lingo
Viva voce—by word of mouth; verbally; 
orally
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ASD USED TO CONFIRM 
REASONABLE GROUNDS OF 
IMPAIRMENT
R. v. Paquet, 2008 NBCA 29
A police officer activated his radar and 
registered the speed of a vehicle 
travelling in the opposite direction at 
123 km/h in an 80 km/h zone.  The 
officer stopped the vehicle and identified the driver 
and one passenger. He noted a smell of alcohol on the 
accused’s breath, red eyes, and that he was 
nervous.  The accused tried to avoid direct eye 
contact, was uncooperative, unable to provide his 
driver’s licence, and visibly aggressive.   The officer 
belived the accused was visibly intoxicated and 
probably not capable of driving a motor vehicle. As a 
result of his observations, the officer demanded the 
accused accompany him to the patrol car and submit 
to a approved screening device test.  The officer 
wanted to confirm the accused’s level of intoxication, 
but he refused and sped away. A pursuit ensued for 
about one kilometre until the accused put his signal 
light on to turn into a private driveway. He was 
arrested for driving while impaired and dangerous 
driving and was taken to the police detachment,  
providing breath samples of 180mg%.  
At trial in New Brunswick Provincial Court the accused 
was convicted of over 80mg%  and obstructing a peace 
officer in the execution of his duty. The trial judge 
noted the accused was nervous, not able to provide his 
driver’s licence, had a strong smell of alcohol on his 
breath, avoided making eye contact with the officer, 
exhibited abnormal or bizarre behaviour, refused to 
accompany the officer to the patrol car, was 
aggressive and uncooperative, and a car chase ensued. 
Recognizing that the standard for reasonable and 
probable grounds is more than a mere suspicion, but 
less than evidence required to convict, the judge 
found the officer had reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe the accused committed an offence 
under s.253(b). Therefore the demand was 
reasonable. 
The accused appealed to the New Brunswick Court of 
Queen’s Bench arguing, among other grounds, that the 
officer did not subjectively have reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe that he was committing an 
offence contrary to s.253. He submitted the evidence 
only showed that the officer merely suspected he 
might have alcohol in his blood when the breathalyzer 
demand was made. In discussing what reasonable 
grounds entailed, appeal Justice Young stated:
The existence of reasonable and probable grounds 
entails both an objective and a subjective 
component.  The police officer must subjectively 
have an honest belief that the suspect has 
committed the offence and objectively there must 
exist reasonable grounds for this belief.   
 
Whether a peace officer has reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe that an offence is being 
committed and therefore, that a demand is 
authorized under s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code is 
essentially a question of fact, and not one of pure 
law.  In other words, it is an issue of mixed fact and 
law. [references omitted, paras. 36-37]
As for the use of an approved screening device 
failure, Justice Young found it could be used for two 
purposes; providing reasonable and probable grounds 
for a breathalzyer test or to confirm reasonable and 
probable grounds. He said:
Indeed, to suspect that a driver has alcohol in his 
body is sufficient to justify a demand [to submit to 
a test with an approved screening device].  But a 
“fail” result, in and of itself, may be sufficient to 
raise the officer’s suspicions to the reasonable and 
probable grounds required to ask a driver to submit 
to the more accurate breathalyser test under s. 
254(3) of the Criminal Code. 
 
A “fail” result on an approved screening device can 
also be used by the peace officer to confirm his 
reasonable grounds, giving him further reasonable 
and probable grounds to believe that the person is 
impaired.  [references omitted, paras. 44-45] 
 
And further: 
A peace officer’s observations as to signs of 
impairment may well be sufficient, in and of 
themselves, to form the basis for the reasonable 
and probable grounds required to make the 
breathalyser demand. 
 
In this case, [the officer’s] testimony shows that, 
subjectively, he had more than a suspicion that [the 
accused] had alcohol in his body. The purpose of the 
screening device test was to confirm [the 
accused’s] high level of intoxication.
 
So, the fact that the officer here asked the 
[accused] to submit to an approved screening device 
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test in the first place does not establish that he did 
not subjectively have reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that [the accused] had 
committed an offence contrary to s. 253 of the 
Criminal Code.  When he read the standard demand 
for [the accused] to submit to the breathalyser, 
the officer expressly stated that he had 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe that 
[the accused] had committed an offence. 
[references omitted, paras. 47-49]
 
In dismissing the accused’s appeal, the appeal judge 
ruled that the trial judge’s findings as to the officer’s 
reasonable and probable grounds were reasonable and 
supported by the evidence as a whole. The accused’s 
conviction was affirmed.  
The accused then appealed to the New Brunswick 
Court of Appeal again arguing, in part, that the officer 
did not have reasonable grounds to believe the 
accused was committing an offence under s.253 and 
demand a breath sample. Justice Deschenes, 
authoring the unanimous judgement of the Court, 
found the accused’s argument was without merit for 
the reasons given by the Court of Queen’s Bench. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
ABSENCE OF PRINTS DID NOT 
EXCULPATE
R. v. Wight, 2008 BCCA 189
Police executed a search warrant at a 
residential property and found a 
marihuana cultivation operation in the 
basement that included 283 budding 
plants and 136 clones, an automatic watering system, 
1,000 watt lights, fans, and ventilation through an 
upstairs closet. A large bag of cannabis bud was found 
in the living room on the main floor and there was an 
odour of marihuana throughout the house along with 
the pervasive noise from fans in the basement.
Three people were arrested at the property, including 
the accused who was found at the bottom of the 
stairs leading from the main floor to the basement.  
He had a vial of cannabis roaches in his pocket.  Police 
found a T-4E form and a Telus bill in the kitchen in the 
name of the accused with a different address. They 
also found a Blockbuster card with his name in a pie 
plate in the kitchen. But police did not find any of his 
fingerprints on the grow equipment. 
At trial the three occupants of the house were 
convicted of producing marihuana and possession for 
the purpose of trafficking, including the accused. In 
finding the accused guilty, the trial judge relied on 
the location where he was found early in the morning, 
the pervasive odour and noise from the cultivation, 
and the documents in his name found in the premises. 
But a fourth person, the tenant of the property, who 
was not present at the time of police entry was later 
charged and subsequently acquitted because he had a 
residence elsewhere.  
The accused appealed to the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that the police search did not 
find documents linking anyone to actually living in the 
house and the documents found in his name were 
insufficient to establish his residency or “significant 
visitation” at the house.   He contended that the 
evidence was consistent with him being simply 
transient and the marihuana found on his person was 
consistent with personal use.  Plus none of his 
fingerprints were found on the equipment in the 
cultivation operation. 
Justice Mackenzie, delivering the opinion of the 
appeal court, noted the elements of both offences 
were knowledge and control.  Knowledge of the 
cultivation could be conclusively inferred from the 
basement location where the accused was found and 
the pervasive noise and smell of the cultivation. Even 
though the circumstances indicated that the accused 
was not the tenant of the premises and may have 
resided elsewhere, “the time of day, the location 
where he was found in the basement, and the 
documents in his name lead convincingly to the 
conclusion that he was more than a casual transient 
and that he was involved in the cultivation,” said 
Justice Mackenzie. “The absence of fingerprints does 
not exculpate him.” Justice Mackenzie held the 
circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support a 
conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
accused had sufficient knowledge and control of the 
marihuana cultivation. The accused’s conviction was 
upheld and his appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Terminology Tip:
Exculpate—to free from blame; prove 
guiltless.
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BYLAW FLASHLIGHT ASSIST 
BREACHES CHARTER
R. v. Kostecki, 2008 BCSC 551
A bylaw enforcement officer attended an 
industrial warehouse unit, consisting of 
an office area and garage beside it, for 
the purpose of inspecting it and 
determining if any business was operating that 
required a business licence. The business licence for 
the unit had expired and had not been renewed. The 
bylaw officer was acting under the authority of a 
Business Licence Bylaw authorizing him as a licensed 
inspector to enter any land, building or other place at 
any reasonable time for the purpose of ascertaining 
whether the regulations and provisions of the bylaw, 
including the necessity for a business licence, were 
being complied with. The unit had two doors, one for 
people to enter and the other a garage door. 
The bylaw officer could not see into the windows 
because they were covered with something.  He 
knocked on the person door twice and the accused 
appeared.  After speaking with the accused about 
business operations, the bylaw officer asked if he 
could come in. The accused said he would check with 
his friends who were working on vehicles inside the 
unit. After waiting for about 15 minutes, the bylaw 
officer became concerned with his safety. He had 
been told there were other males present, could not 
see inside, and wanted to do an inspection. He 
concluded it probably was not the safest situation for 
him to inspect on his own so he contacted the local 
police and asked if an officer could be sent to ensure 
the peace. 
Before the police officer arrived, the bylaw officer 
had another conversation with the accused. He was 
further told the other men inside were busy building 
a mezzanine, which would require a building permit and 
raised concerns about fire and safety issues. He was 
also told that the accused was putting a mattress in 
for a place to reside, which was was an unauthorized 
use of the property. When the police officer arrived, 
the bylaw officer told the accused he was going to 
inspect the premises. The bylaw officer entered, 
followed by the police officer. There was no business 
activity apparent inside the unit or any other people. 
Inside the garage was a transport trailer. The bylaw 
officer looked in the trailer but it was too dark to see 
anything.  He asked the police officer to shine his 
flashlight into the trailer, which he did. The police 
officer discovered a marihuana grow operation in 
progress and immediately arrested the accused and 
read him his Charter rights. He was transported to 
the police detachment and a search warrant was 
obtained for the premises.  The accused was charged 
with possessing marihuana for the purpose of 
trafficking and unlawfully producing the drug.
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court, the 
accused challenged the search for and seizure of the 
marihuana because he argued the police violated his 
Charter rights under s.8. In first finding the bylaw 
officer had the authority to enter the premises for 
inspection, Justice Truscott said:
A bylaw officer does not need consent to enter 
premises for the purpose of ascertaining compliance 
with the bylaws, if the bylaws authorize such entry.  
The bylaw officer does not need a search warrant 
as the entry does not violate protection against 
unreasonable search and seizure covered by s. 8 of 
the Charter.
Here [the bylaw officer] was given the authority to 
enter at any reasonable time by the bylaw and the 
bylaw itself does not offend s. 8.  
Here [the bylaw officer] sought to inspect for 
bylaw compliance at a reasonable time and his 
actions did not offend s. 8. [references omitted, 
paras. 33-35]
As for the officer accompanying the bylaw officer, 
Justice Truscott concluded it was appropriate. The 
bylaw officer had the authority to enter without a 
warrant and the police could accompany him for 
peacekeeping reasons:
I conclude that [the police officer] had the right 
to enter to ensure the peace while [the bylaw 
officer] performed his duties. Whether his 
authority came from statutes directly or from the 
general duties of a police officer to keep the peace, 
I am satisfied that he had that authority to enter 
for that purpose. [para. 38]
However, the police officer’s use of the flashlight was 
problematic. The police officer himself had no 
warrant to search or seize anything nor did he have 
the accused’s consent to search the trailer. He 
testified he did not give his flashlight to the bylaw 
officer to use because it was his policy to not lend out 
his tools. Justice Truscott found he was acting in his 
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capacity as a police officer when he searched the 
trailer with his flashlight rather than acting only as 
the bylaw officer’s assistant in carrying out the duties 
of the bylaw officer. The police officer therefore 
breached the accused’s s.8 Charter rights. Justice 
Truscott described this as follows:
If [the police officer] was entitled to be in the unit 
with [the bylaw officer] to keep the peace and [the 
bylaw officer] had used [the police officer’s] 
flashlight and discovered the marihuana grow 
operation himself, he would likely have reported 
that to [the police officer] standing by and [he] 
would have had grounds to arrest [the accused] and 
grounds for a search warrant.
As it was, it was [the police officer] who discovered 
the marihuana grow operation himself and then 
arrested [the accused].
I conclude that [the police officer] overstepped his 
authority as a police officer in searching the trailer 
with his flashlight. He did not say in his evidence 
that he was doing so as part of his responsibility to 
ensure the peace.  The only evidence is that he did 
this at the request of [the bylaw officer] to assist 
in his inspection of the trailer. [paras. 41-43]
Since the search warrant was based substantially on 
the grounds of the police officer’s own observation of 
the marihuana grow operation in the trailer the 
warrant was set aside. The marihuana evidence was 
therefore obtained as a result of a Charter breach.
The evidence, however, was admissible under s.24(2). 
The marihuana was non-conscriptive evidence that 
would not affect trial fairness. The Charter violation 
was not serious, but rather it was inadvertent or a 
technical breach. Nor did the police officer act in bad 
faith when he shone his flashlight into the trailer. He 
did it to aid the bylaw officer in doing his inspection. 
The police officer could have obtained the same 
information from the bylaw officer if he had given the 
flashlight to the bylaw officer to use. Further, the 
accused did not have any significant expectation of 
privacy in the unit or in the trailer. As well, possessing 
a marihuana grow operation for the purpose of 
trafficking and unlawful cultivation are serious 
offences in this society where drug use is becoming a 
bigger problem every day. The marihuana evidence was 
crucial to the Crown’s case and the admission of this 
evidence would not bring the administration of justice 
into disrepute.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
NO NEED FOR DANGER
ANALYSIS IN PRESUMPTIVE 
CARE OR CONTROL
R. v. Hayes, 2008 NSCA 23
 
At about 1:00 am the accused was 
returning home in minus eight degree 
Celcius weather on his snowmobile when 
it became immobilized on a highway in a 
residential area without street lights, although the 
engine continued to operate.  He tried to get his 
snowmobile moving again by examining and working on 
it on the highway. He grabbed it by its sides, put his 
feet into the tracks, and pulled up on it to see if the 
track was frozen and would break free. During the 
half hour he worked on the snowmobile the accused 
drank a pint of rum. He sat on the driver’s seat, 
smoked a cigarette and fell asleep with the engine still 
running and the snowmobile in the middle of the lane 
with no lights on.
 
Two police officers on patrol came across the accused 
asleep on the driver’s seat of his snowmobile at 3:10 
a.m. There was no other traffic on the highway and 
the accused’s helmet and one mitten were lying on the 
ground beside the snowmobile. He smelled strongly of 
alcohol and had to be supported by the officers to 
walk from his snowmobile to the police car.
 
At trial in Nova Scotia Provincial Court the accused 
was found guilty of having care or control of a motor 
vehicle, a snowmobile, while impaired by alcohol 
contrary to s.253(a) of the Criminal Code.  The judge 
was not satisfied the accused had established, on the 
balance of probabilities, that he would not put the 
snowmobile in motion if he could. Furthermore, by 
leaving the motor vehicle on the highway he 
endangered other users of the highway while in care 
or control. He was fined $600, ordered to pay a victim 
impact surcharge, and had the minimum one year 
Canada wide driving prohibition imposed.
The accused  successfully appealed his conviction to 
the Nova Scotia Supreme Court.  The appeal judge 
found the trial judge was unclear why he had 
convicted the accused; on the basis that he was 
deemed to have care or control of the snowmobile 
because he had not rebutted the s.258 presumption 
or on the basis of actual care or control. The appeal 
judge found that the trial judge accepted the 
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accused’s testimony that he did not intend to set his 
snowmobile in motion after he had worked on it and 
drank his rum for half an hour. As for actual care or 
control, the appeal judge concluded their was no risk 
of danger to the public by leaving the snowmobile on 
the highway. An acquittal was entered. The Crown 
then appealed to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal. 
Under s.253 of the Criminal Code, every one commits 
an offence who has the care or control of a motor 
vehicle, whether it is in motion or not, while the 
person’s ability to operate the vehicle is impaired by 
alcohol. Under s.258(1)(a)  a person who occupies the 
operators seat of a motor vehicle shall be deemed, or 
presumptively be held, to have care or control of the 
vehicle unless they establish that they did not occupy 
that seat or position for the purpose of setting the 
vehicle in motion.  If the presumption is not rebutted 
there is no need for the court to decide whether 
there was a risk of danger to the public or whether 
the vehicle was operable or immovable. The 
operability or dangerousness of the vehicle is 
irrelevant.
 
In this case, the trial judge found the accused had not 
rebutted the presumption and was therefore in 
presumptive care or control of his snowmobile.  “Not 
having rebutted the s.258(1)(a) presumption, the trial 
judge was required by law to find [the accused] was 
deemed to have care or control of his vehicle and was 
guilty,” said Justice Hamilton, authoring the 
unanimous opinion of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
BY THE BOOK:
s.258(1)(a) Criminal Code:
“In any proceedings under subsection 
255(1) in respect of an offence committed 
under section 253 or in any proceedings 
under subsection 255(2) or (3), (a) where it 
is proved that the accused occupied the 
seat or position ordinarily occupied by a 
person who operates a motor vehicle ... the accused shall be 
deemed to have had the care or control of the vehicle ... 
unless the accused establishes that the accused did not 
occupy that seat or position for the purpose of setting the 
vehicle ... in motion ...”
 
CSO BREACH PROCEEDINGS MUST 
INCLUDE WITNESSES 
STATEMENTS
R. v. McIvor, 2008 SCC 11 
The offender was sentenced to a 12-
month conditional sentence for a number 
of property-related offences. Her 
conditions included that she not be in the 
direct company of her co-accused without permission 
from her sentence supervisor, obey a curfew unless 
authorized in writing by her supervisor or required to 
be outside her residence for a bona fide medical 
emergency, keep the peace and be of good behaviour; 
and not possess identification, credit cards, cheques 
or documents in any name other than her own. While 
under sentence, she was involved in a motor vehicle 
collision while a passenger in a vehicle driven by her 
co-accused. She was also outside of her residence 
past her curfew and in possession of stolen property 
found in the vehicle, which included identification and 
other documents in the names of third parties.
At the breach of conditional sentence hearing, the 
Crown relied exclusively on the supervisor’s report, 
adduced in accordance with the notice and service 
requirements under the Criminal Code (ss.742.6(5) 
and (6)). The report, signed by the supervisor, set out 
the relevant conditions and stated the accused had 
not been given permission to be out beyond her curfew 
or to be in contact with her co-accused. Attached to 
the supervisor’s report was a comprehensive police 
report prepared by the investigating officer, who was 
not himself a witness to any of the material facts. The 
report summarized the information obtained from 
several witnesses concerning the circumstances 
surrounding the motor vehicle collision. However, 
there were no signed statements from any of the 
witnesses included in the police officer’s report. 
During a preliminary motion in British Columbia 
Provincial Court, the accused sought a dismissal of the 
breach allegations on the ground that the supervisor 
had failed to include signed statements of witnesses 
with his report, contrary to s. 742.6(4). This section 
states:
An allegation of a breach of condition must be 
supported by a written report of the supervisor, 
which report must include, where appropriate, 
signed statements of witnesses.
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The Provincial Court judge rejected the accused’s 
argument, found her in breach, terminated her 
conditional sentence order, and committed her to 
custody until the expiration of her sentence.
The accused appealed to the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal. A majority overturned the hearing judge’s 
decision. Justice Smith, along with Justice Donald, 
found the comprehensive police report was not a 
witness statement within the meaning of s.742.6(4) 
because a “witness” is a person present at an event 
and able to give information about it. Rather, 
“statements of witnesses” refers “to written 
accounts of the facts alleged to constitute the breach 
prepared by persons having personal knowledge of 
those facts. 
In Justice Smith’s view, the supervisor’s report 
lacked signed statements of witnesses and was 
therefore inadmissible as evidence. He set aside the 
order of the hearing judge and restored the 
conditional sentence. Justice Hall, in dissent, found 
the police officer’s report was the functional 
equivalent of a signed witness statement. The police 
report was very detailed, seemed reliable on its face, 
and provided sufficient information to allow the 
accused to challenge its contents. In his view, the 
accused could apply to have any witness attend before 
the court for cross-examination and therefore there 
was no possible unfairness in the hearing proceedings. 
Justice Hall found that the majority’s approach 
elevated form over substance, and did not accord with 
Parliament’s intent to create an expeditious breach 
process.
The Crown then appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada arguing the supervisor’s written report is 
admissible in evidence as long as the notice 
requirements under s.742.6(5) are complied with. The 
hearing judge can then determine whether it would 
have been appropriate for the supervisor to include 
“signed statements of witnesses” and to assign the 
necessary weight to the report on a case-by-case 
basis.  
Justice Charron, authoring the unanimous judgment 
for the seven member court, first noted several 
characteristics of a conditional sentence breach 
proceeding including: 
• it is not simply a hearing to obtain information 
about the offender’s background in order to 
fashion a fit sentence; and
• it is more akin to a prosecution for breach of 
probation, coupled with a revocation hearing to lift 
the suspension of a sentence.
R. v. McIvor, 2008 SCC 11 - Probation / CSO Comparison Grid
Breach Probation Breach Conditional Sentence
Nature or proceedings New distinct criminal offence
S.733.1 CCC
Not a new offence
Punishment 2 yrs imprisonment (max)
-if suspended sentence, probation order 
can be revoked and accused sentenced 
for original offence
Incarceration for time remaining on 
original sentence
-if CSO breached, presumption offender 
should serve remainder of sentence
Arrest Dual offence (s.495 CCC) Treat as indictable offence (s.495 CCC)
Release Usual procedures apply Reverse onus (s.515(6) CCC)
Proceeding commencement Laying of charge proceeds in usual way Within 30 days (or as soon as practicable) 
Standard or proof Beyond a reasonable doubt Balance of probabilities
Evidentiary rules Common law rules applicable to criminal 
courts
Special statutory regime
• Comply with hearsay exclusionary rule
• Evidence generally presented by viva 
voce testimony
• Right to cross-examination
• Allows for documentary proof of breach
• Imposes a leave requirement on cross-
examination
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Justice Charron concluded that the hearing judge had 
no admissible evidence before him on which to find 
the accused had breached her conditional sentence 
order. The supervisor’s report, regardless of its 
contents, was not admissible unless it included signed 
statements of witnesses. She stated:
… the Crown contends that the supervisor’s report, 
whatever its contents, is admissible so long as the 
notice and service requirements set out in s. 
742.6(5) have been complied with. According to the 
Crown, whether or not to include signed statements 
of witnesses is left entirely to the discretion of the 
supervisor or the prosecutor. I do not accept this 
argument. It ignores the mandatory language of s. 
742.6(4). Parliament’s intent that the inclusion of 
signed statements of witnesses be mandatory in 
certain circumstances is manifest by its choice of 
the word “must” in the English version and the 
expression “le cas échéant” in the French version. 
The Crown’s argument also fails to consider the 
usual evidentiary rules against which the statutory 
provision was enacted. In other words, in 
interpreting the meaning of s. 742.6(4), one must 
ask to what extent did Parliament intend to depart 
from the ordinary rules of evidence that would 
otherwise apply?
If the Crown is correct in saying that the 
supervisor’s report is admissible, however 
formulated, the supervisor alone could in all cases 
provide admissible evidence regarding the breach. 
This would be so regardless of whether he or she 
had any direct knowledge of the material facts 
alleged to constitute the breach. If Parliament had 
so intended, there would have been no need to make 
reference to signed statements of witnesses at all, 
let alone provide that they “must” be included where 
appropriate. The approach advocated by the Crown 
would also constitute a significant departure from 
the rules of evidence that ordinarily circumscribe 
the scope of a witness’s admissible testimony. In 
the context of this case for example, this would 
mean that the supervisor himself, from the 
viewpoint of his desk, would be permitted to provide 
evidence that [the offender] was out beyond her 
curfew, in the company of her co-accused …, and in 
possession of stolen goods, including documents in a 
name other than her own. I find it of interest to 
note that even  proof of service of the report 
requires a more demanding standard than that 
proposed by the Crown for proof of the breach 
itself. Under s. 742.6(6), service of the report may 
be proven by oral evidence under oath, or an 
affidavit or solemn declaration, by “the person 
claiming to have served it”.
… [S]ubject to leave being granted requiring the 
attendance of any of the witnesses, the legislative 
scheme simply allows the Crown to prove the breach 
by adducing in documentary form the evidence it 
would otherwise have been required to present in 
the usual way by viva voce evidence. As such, it is an 
enabling provision. Of course, documentary evidence 
admissible under some other statutory authority, 
such as s. 30 of the Canada Evidence Act…continues 
to be admissible. (I note in this respect that [police 
officer’s] report would not be admissible under this 
latter provision because s. 30(10) expressly excepts 
“a record made in the course of an investigation” 
from its application.) [paras. 21-23]
However, Justice Charron held that the contents of 
the documents that may be introduced under 
s.742.6(4) is not limited in terms of “firsthand 
knowledge” as the majority of the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal had ruled. 
…Under the usual common law evidentiary rules, a 
witness’s testimony is not necessarily restricted to 
personal observations. The contents of the 
supervisor’s report and of any witness statement 
should likewise be defined in terms of what the 
author of the report or the statement could testify 
to if called to give viva voce testimony. Indeed, the 
supervisor or witness may well end up before the 
court if leave is granted under s. 742.6(8) requiring 
their attendance for cross-examination. The 
contents of the documents adduced under 
s.742.6(4) and (5) should mirror what their 
testimony would be.
In some cases, the supervisor will be in a position to 
provide all of the information necessary to prove 
the allegation of breach. For example, this would be 
the case if the alleged breach consisted of a failure 
to report to the supervisor, or a refusal to attend 
for counselling as directed. In the present case, the 
supervisor could attest to the fact that he had 
“read the CSO to [the offender], explained the 
conditions and the consequences of failure to 
comply by those conditions”. He could also attest, 
as stated in his report, that he had never given 
“[the offender] written permission to be out 
beyond her curfew or to be in the company of [her 
co-accused]”. However, the supervisor could not 
have provided admissible testimony about any of 
the facts alleged to constitute the breaches of the 
conditional sentence order if called upon to testify. 
[The police officer] was in no better position. To 
the extent that the supervisor’s report exceeded 
those boundaries, it was inadmissible as proof of 
breach. Given the nature of the allegations, it 
www.10-8.ca24
Volume 8 Issue 3
May/June 2008
became “appropriate” and necessary to include 
“signed statements of witnesses” from those 
persons who could provide information about the 
material facts.
I stated earlier that the contents of the 
supervisor’s report or of any witness statement 
need not be confined to firsthand knowledge where 
the information would be otherwise admissible if 
offered viva voce. For example, the report may 
include a summary of evidence expected to be 
non-contentious, even if the supervisor could not 
personally give that evidence. Since a copy of the 
report must be served on the offender, any 
question concerning the admissibility of this 
evidence can be resolved between the parties by 
agreement. If no agreement can be reached, a 
signed witness statement may be sought where 
appropriate. In addition, in the context of this 
expedited proceeding, the supervisor may well 
include in his report relevant information about the 
offender to assist the court in determining an 
appropriate sanction in the event that the court 
finds that the offender breached a condition of the
conditional sentence order. Similarly, the signed 
report of an investigating police officer may be 
included even if it is not grounded in the personal 
knowledge of the officer where it provides relevant 
context concerning the material facts. For example,
the police report may well disclose some 
circumstance that would call into question the 
reliability of a witness’s statement. The evidence 
would be admissible, in the same way as the police 
officer’s testimony would be, for that limited 
purpose.
In my view, Parliament sought to achieve a proper 
balance between the need for an efficient process 
and the requirements of procedural fairness. By 
allowing the prosecution to present all of its 
evidence in documentary form, it is not necessary 
to routinely marshall witnesses before the court in 
every case. The hearing may proceed in a simpler 
and more expedited fashion. On the other hand, the 
requirement that signed statements of witnesses 
be included assures a minimum level of reliability. 
Personal authentication of the material facts 
alleged to constitute a breach is important. It is 
one thing to have the actual witnesses attesting to 
the material facts by apposing their signature, and 
quite another for a police officer to repeat 
information received from witnesses, or a 
supervisor to relate it third hand…. [paras. 24-27]
The Crown’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
WHAT ARE A CSO’s 
COMPULSORY CONDITIONS?
Under s.742.3(1) of the Criminal Code a court shall 
prescribe an offender to do all of the following as 
conditions of a conditional sentence order: 
• keep the peace and be of good behaviour;
• appear before the court when required to do so 
by the court;
• report to a supervisor within two working days, 
or such longer period as the court directs, after 
the making of the conditional sentence order, 
and thereafter, when required by the supervisor 
and in the manner directed by the supervisor;
• remain within the jurisdiction of the court 
unless written permission to go outside that 
jurisdiction is obtained from the court or the 
supervisor; and
• notify the court or the supervisor in advance of 
any change of name or address, and promptly 
notify the court or the supervisor of any change 
of employment or occupation.
WHAT CAN A JUDGE DO IF 
A CSO IS BREACHED?
s.762(9) of the Criminal Code allows a court, when 
satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that an 
offender has  breached a condition of the CSO to 
do several things:
• take no action;
• change the optional conditions;
• suspend the conditional sentence order and 
direct that the offender serve in custody a 
portion of the unexpired sentence and that 
the conditional sentence order resume on the 
offender’s release from custody, either with 
or without changes to the optional 
conditions; or
• terminate the conditional sentence order and 
direct that the offender be committed to 
custody until the expiration of the sentence.
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NO BAD FAITH WHEN POLICE 
RELY ON MISTAKEN AUTHORITY 
OF CHILD CARE WORKER
R. v. Renshaw, 2008 ONCA 379
A Children’s Aid Society (CAS) worker 
attended a residence and entered it to 
investigate whether the home contained 
a child in need of protection. At the 
request of CAS, police officers accompanied the 
worker to keep the peace and provide protection. 
During the entry police found marihuana being grown. 
At trial in the Superior Court of Justice, the judge 
found the CAS worker did not have the authority to 
enter the residence, although she had an honest, but 
mistaken belief, she could. The police therefore 
conducted an illegal search and breached the 
accused’s s.8 Charter rights when they entered. Even 
though the judge found the violation serious since it 
involved an illegal trespass onto private residential 
premises without a warrant, the evidence was 
admitted anyway. He found the Charter breach was 
not flagrant, brazen, deliberate or wilful. The accused 
was convicted of possessing marihuana for the 
purpose of trafficking and production of marihuana.  
The accused appealed his conviction to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal arguing the trial judge erred in 
admitting the evidence under s.24(2) because the 
breach was more serious than he found and not 
properly assessed and accounted for in the s.24(2) 
analysis. The Appeal Court, however, dismissed the 
appeal.
First, the admission of the evidence would not affect 
trial fairness. Second, although the breach was 
serious, the accompanying police officers were 
entitled to rely on the CAS worker’s authority to 
enter the premises when carrying out their duty to 
respond to a request for assistance by a childcare 
worker. Nor did police act in bad faith. As the Appeal 
Court stated:
On the findings of the trial judge, this was not a 
police investigation and the police had no prior 
interest in the [accused]. The police had a duty to 
respond to a request for assistance from the CAS 
and the evidence supported the propriety of a CAS 
concern about the safety of the CAS worker who 
attended at the [accused’s] home. The trial judge 
also found that the police did not participate in 
questioning the [accused] and that they were 
performing their primary function of keeping the 
peace by providing protection to the CAS 
worker.  Finally, we reiterate that the trial judge 
found, and the [accused] accepts, that the involved 
police officers were entitled to assume that the 
CAS was exercising its authority lawfully when the 
CAS worker entered the [accused’s] home. [para. 11]
Although a warrantless search of a personal residence 
is a serious matter, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
concluded the case did not fall within the most serious 
category of Charter breaches.  The trial judge 
assessed  the impact of excluding the evidence on the 
administration of justice and properly admitted it. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.  
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
APPROACH TO HOME OK TO 
INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE 
OFFENCE
R. v. Desrochers, 2008 ONCA 255
 
The accused was injured in a motorcycle 
accident after he drove at a high rate of 
speed into an ‘S’ curve and slid.  Two 
civilian witnesses saw the accident and 
aroused the accused, who was now snoring and smelled 
of alcohol. After coming to, the accused got back on 
his motorcycle and drove away. The civilians called 911 
and followed him for seven kilometers where he 
stopped at a residence and entered the garage on his 
motorcycle. A police officer dispatched to the scene 
of the accident noted a large skid mark and that the 
road was either in a state of disrepair or had been 
resurfaced with gravel.  He then went to the accused’s 
home, where he gathered information from one of the 
witnesses that the accused might be impaired, had 
blood on his hands and face, had been snoring while 
unconscious, and was seen enter the garage.  
When the officer approached the front door and 
knocked he heard people running.  Shortly thereafter 
the accused’s wife answered the door and the officer 
entered the foyer area of the front entrance across 
the threshold but within the radius of the front door 
plane.  The accused’s wife did not object and while 
talking to the officer continued to have her hand on 
the handle of the front door.  The officer asked the 
accused’s wife if her husband required medical 
attention, but she stated that he would be all right.  
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When asked if he could speak to the accused, his wife 
said he was “in bed”. He asked again and the accused’s 
wife went to find him.  
The accused, dressed in a bathrobe, presented 
himself to the officer. The officer noted injuries and 
asked if he was all right. The accused said “Yes”, but 
was offered an ambulance anyway and declined. When 
asked for his driving documents to complete an 
accident report, the accused declined, saying “There 
was no accident”.   The officer asked again but the 
accused said,  “No, I’m not giving them.”  The officer 
noted a strong odour of alcohol coming from the 
accused, bloodshot eyes, and poor balance—he was 
swaying while standing. The officer formed the opinion 
that the accused was impaired by alcohol and arrested 
him.  His speech was slightly slurred and his eyes were 
glassy.  He subsequently provided two breath 
samples—190mg% and 195mg%.  He was charged with 
impaired driving and over 80mg%. 
At trial in the Ontario Court of 
Justice, the judge concluded the 
officer was conducting a 
preliminary investigation when he 
went to the accused’s door, as 
opposed to seeking evidence with 
respect to a criminal offence that 
he believed had taken place.   He 
also found the officer did not act 
unconstitutionally when he stepped 
inside the threshold of the 
residence when the accused’s wife backed up, and 
remained within the radius of the front door plane 
without objection while he engaged in conversation. 
The judge found the officer’s intentions in 
approaching the residence were twofold: 
1) to investigate concerns with respect to the 
observations made by the witnesses. The officer 
was conducting a preliminary investigation to 
determine whether there was any evidence of a 
criminal offence having taken place.  The officer 
was fulfilling his legal duty in conducting the 
investigation by going to the doorway of the 
residence.  The conversation was at a place 
“where guests are usually greeted” and the 
officer was not told to leave, did not push his way 
in,  and there was a lower expectation of privacy 
at the entrance to the household. Exigent 
circumstances (the investigation of a suspected 
impaired driver) may have also existed entitling 
the officer to be present at the residence; and 
2) to address issues with respect to possible injury.  
The trial judge ruled there was no s.8 Charter breach 
and the accused was convicted of impaired driving. 
The accused unsuccessfully appealed to the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice, arguing the trial judge 
erred in not finding a s.8 Charter breach. The officer 
was fulfilling his obligations pursuant to the Ontario 
Police Services Act by investigating circumstances 
that might have constituted criminal conduct resulting 
in possible injury. This case was not like the Supreme 
Court of Canada judgment in R. v. Evans, (1996), 104 
C.C.C. (3d) 23 (S.C.C.), where the only purpose of the 
officer’s knocking on the door was to determine 
whether there was a smell of marijuana in the house 
and therefore took the police 
attendance outside the invitation 
to knock doctrine. In this case it 
was necessary to engage the 
occupants in questioning and 
conversation. The purpose of the 
police was to ask questions of the 
homeowner and their intent to 
facilitate communication, even 
investigative questioning, did not 
exceed the bounds of the implied 
right to approach and knock. 
“While citizens are entitled to a high expectation of 
privacy with respect to their homes, a criminal is not 
immune from arrest in his own home and there are 
strong policy considerations militating against making 
a home a sanctuary against arrest and encouraging 
individuals to see the police,” said the appeal judge. 
“Occupiers of dwelling houses give an implied licence 
to any member of the public, including police officers 
on lawful business, to come on to private property and 
knock at the doors of the dwellings.” The officer was 
entitled to approach and knock on the door of the 
suspect and make inquiries as to whether he wished to 
speak to him.  The fact the interview occurred slightly 
inside the boundary of the home, and within the radius 
of the front door, did not vitiate otherwise wholly 
lawful conduct.  If it did, the right protected by the 
“[T]he officer did not go to the door 
under a pretext and with the 
intention of conducting an unlawful 
search of the home.  The implied 
invitation doctrine applies to this 
case and renders the police 
conduct in approaching the house 
and knocking on the door lawful.”
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Charter would have been trivialized. (see R. v. 
Desrochers (2007) Court File No. 04-11353 for 
details).
The accused then challenged the appeal court’s ruling 
to the Ontario Court of Appeal. In its endorsement of 
the lower courts, the Ontario Court of Appeal said this:
The trial judge accepted the officer’s evidence that 
he went to the door to speak with the [accused] in 
connection with the accident that he had been 
involved in a short time earlier. Unlike Evans, the 
officer did not go to the door under a pretext and 
with the intention of conducting an unlawful search 
of the home.  The implied invitation doctrine applies 
to this case and renders the police conduct in 
approaching the house and knocking on the door 
lawful.
The contention that the officer’s entry into the 
house violated s. 8 of the Charter cannot succeed in 
the face of the trial judge’s finding that the officer 
stepped into the foyer at the entrance to the home 
on the implied invitation of [the accused’s wife].  
That finding was open on the evidence.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
‘IN SERVICE’ 
LEGAL ROAD TEST ANSWERS
1. (d) Articulable cause—see R. v. Kang-Brown (at p. 
6 of this publication). 
2. (b) False—see R. v. Gundy (at p. 14 of this 
publication). 
3. (a) True—see R. v. Hayes (at p. 20 of this 
publication). 
4. (a) True—see R. v. McIvor (at p. 21 of this 
publication). 
5. (a) True—see R. v. D.B. (at p. 27 of this 
publication). 
6. (d) All of the above—see R. v. Wittwer (at p.  42 of 
this publication)  
Note-able Quote
“Do the best you can in every task, no matter how 
unimportant it may seem at the time. No one learns 
more about a problem than the person at the bottom.”
- Sandra Day O’Connor
YCJA ADULT PRESUMPTIVE 
SENTENCING 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
R. v. D.B., 2008 SCC 25 
The accused, a 17 year old youth, pled 
guilty to manslaughter after knocking  the 
18 year old victim to the ground and 
punching him. The victim lost 
consciousness and died. Manslaughter is a presumptive 
offence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA). 
The accused sought a youth sentence under the YCJA, 
where the maximum is three years imprisonment. The 
Crown, on the other hand, sought an adult sentence 
and recommended five years’ imprisonment. 
In the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the accused 
challenged the constitutionality of the presumptive 
YCJA provisions which place the onus on a young 
person to prove that a youth sentence, not an adult 
one, should be imposed. He also challenged the 
constitutionality of the provision that requires the 
young person justify the continuance of a ban 
protecting him from publicity. The judge allowed the 
Charter challenge and concluded that a youth 
sentence involving intensive rehabilitation custody 
would be an appropriate punishment. He imposed a 
youth sentence of 30 months in a juvenile correctional 
facility
The Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a Crown appeal, 
holding the onus provision in the YCJA placed a 
considerable burden on the young person. This reverse 
onus provision breached two principles of fundamental 
justice:
1) young offenders should be dealt with separately 
and not as adults in recognition of their reduced 
maturity; and 
2) the Crown must assume the burden of 
demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that 
there are aggravating circumstances in the 
commission of the offence that warrant a more 
severe penalty. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal also held that the 
publication ban provisions contravene s.7 of the 
Charter because publishing a young person’s identity 
adds to the harshness of their punishment and the 
Crown should bear the burden of proving that it is 
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appropriate for the young person to be deprived of 
the ban. These s.7 violations  could not be saved by s.1 
of the Charter. The Crown then appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Canada. 
Presumptive Provisions
In a split decision (5:4), Canada’s highest court ruled 
that the reverse onus provisions do violate the 
Charter. Section 7 guarantees that “everyone has the 
right to life, liberty and security of the person and 
the right not to be deprived thereof except in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice.” Presumptive offences under the YCJA 
include first and second degree murder, attempted 
murder, manslaughter, aggravated sexual assault, and 
other serious violent offences committed by a youth 
who is at least 14 years old. The YCJA requires that 
young persons convicted of a presumptive offence 
shall be sentenced as adults unless the youth can 
justify the imposition of a youth sentence. In other 
words, this sentencing scheme requires the young 
person to prove that the presumption should not apply, 
rather than the Crown being required to show why it 
should. If a young person convicted of a presumptive 
offence makes an application for a youth sentence, the 
court is required to consider the seriousness and 
circumstances of the offence, and the age, maturity, 
character, background and previous record of the 
young person and any other relevant factors.  
Justice Abella, writing the opinion of the majority, 
concluded that placing the onus on young persons to 
displace the presumption of an adult sentence violated 
s.7. Because of their age, young people have 
heightened vulnerability, less maturity and a reduced 
capacity for moral judgment. And Canada has a 
separate legal and sentencing regime for young people. 
Therefore, this entitles young people to a presumption 
of diminished moral blameworthiness or culpability. 
The YCJA also has numerous sentencing provisions 
designed to protect young persons from custody. For 
example, the police must consider whether 
alternatives such as extra-judicial measures or extra-
judicial sanctions would be adequate before 
proceeding to court. As well, the YCJA sends a clear 
message about restricting the use of custody for 
young offenders.  
In order for a principle to be one of fundamental 
justice under s.7, three criteria must be met: 
1) it must be a legal principle; 
2) there must be a consensus that the rule or 
principle is fundamental to the way in which the 
legal system ought fairly to operate; and 
3) it must be identified with sufficient precision to 
yield a manageable standard against which to 
measure deprivations of life, liberty or security of 
the person.
Justice Abella found that the principle of a 
presumption of diminished moral culpability was a legal 
principle. Special rules based on reduced maturity and 
moral capacity have long governed young criminals and 
Canada has consistently acknowledged the diminished 
responsibility and distinctive vulnerability of young 
persons in its legislation. And there is little doubt that 
this principle is fundamental to the operation of a fair 
legal system. Finally, “the principle that young people 
are entitled to a presumption of diminished moral 
culpability throughout any proceedings against them, 
including during sentencing, is readily administrable 
and sufficiently precise to yield a manageable 
standard.” 
The presumption of an adult sentence in the onus 
provisions is inconsistent with the principle of 
fundamental justice that young people are entitled to 
a presumption of diminished moral culpability. By 
putting the onus on the young person to justify their 
continued entitlement to the presumption (of being 
treated as a youth), rather than on the Crown to 
demonstrate why it no longer applies, breaches s.7 of 
the Charter. Justice Abella stated:
Because the presumptive sentence is an adult one, 
the young person must provide the court with the 
information and counter-arguments to justify a 
youth sentence. If the young person fails to 
persuade the court that a youth sentence is 
sufficiently lengthy based on the factors set out in 
s. 72(1), an adult sentence must be imposed. This 
forces the young person to rebut the presumption 
of an adult sentence, rather than requiring the 
Crown to justify an adult sentence. It is therefore 
a reverse onus.
No one seriously disputes that there are wide 
variations in the maturity and sophistication of 
young persons over the age of 14 who commit serious 
offences. But the onus provisions in the presumptive 
offences sentencing regime stipulate that it is the 
offence, rather than the age of the person, that 
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determines how he or she should be sentenced. This 
clearly deprives young people of the benefit of the 
presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness 
based on age. By depriving them of this presumption 
because of the crime and despite their age, and by 
putting the onus on them to prove that they remain 
entitled to the procedural and substantive 
protections to which their age entitles them, 
including a youth sentence, the onus provisions 
infringe a principle of fundamental justice. [paras. 
75-76]
And further:
In the case of presumptive offences, it is the young 
person who must satisfy the court of the factors 
justifying a youth sentence, whereas it is normally 
the Crown who is required to satisfy the court of any 
factors justifying a more severe sentence. A 
maximum adult sentence in the case of presumptive 
offences is, by definition, more severe than the 
maximum permitted for a youth sentence. A youth 
sentence for murder cannot exceed ten years; for 
second degree murder, seven; and for manslaughter, 
three. The maximum adult sentence for these 
offences is life in prison.
A young person should receive, at the very least, the 
same procedural benefit afforded to a convicted 
adult on sentencing, namely, that the burden is on 
the Crown to demonstrate why a more severe 
sentence is necessary and appropriate in any given 
case. The onus on the young person reverses this 
traditional onus on the Crown and is, consequently, a 
breach of s. 7. [paras. 81-82]
Privacy Provisions
The privacy provisions in the YCJA determine whether 
or not a young person’s identity will be disclosed. 
When a young person is convicted of a presumptive 
offence they lose the privacy protection of a 
publication ban, which restricts the information about 
them that can be made publicly available. In the case 
of a young person receiving an adult sentence, they 
cannot apply for a publication ban. And in the case of 
a young person being convicted of a presumptive 
offence but given a youth sentence,  a publication ban 
that normally attaches to a youth sentence is not 
imposed. Rather, the young person must satisfy the 
court that a publication ban should be imposed. The 
majority ruled that this onus on young persons to 
demonstrate why they remain entitled to the ongoing 
protection of a publication ban also infringed s. 7:
… lifting a ban on publication makes the young person 
vulnerable to greater psychological and social 
stress. Accordingly, it renders the sentence 
significantly more severe. A publication ban is part 
of a young person’s sentence (s. 75(4)). It is 
therefore subject to the same presumption as the 
rest of his or her sentence. Losing the protection of 
a publication ban renders the sentence more severe. 
The onus should therefore be, as with the imposition 
of an adult sentence, on the Crown to justify the 
enhanced severity, rather than on the youth to 
justify retaining the protection to which he or she 
is otherwise presumed to be entitled. The reversal 
of this onus too is a breach of s. 7. [para. 87]
Further, the saving provision of s.1 of the Charter 
could not justify the breaches. The majority found 
that Parliament’s objectives could easily be met by 
placing the onus on the Crown:
This does not make young persons less accountable 
for serious offences; it makes them differently 
accountable. Nor does it mean that a court cannot 
impose an adult sentence on a young person. It 
means that before a court can do so, the Crown, not 
the young person, should have the burden of 
showing that the presumption of diminished moral 
culpability has been rebutted and that the young 
person is no longer entitled to its protection. 
Promoting the protection of the public is equally 
well served by putting this onus on the Crown, where 
it belongs. The Crown may still persuade a youth 
court judge that an adult sentence or the lifting of 
a publication ban is warranted where a serious crime 
has been committed. And young persons will 
continue to be accountable in accordance with their 
personal circumstances and the seriousness of the 
offence. But the burden of demonstrating that 
more serious consequences are warranted will be, as 
it properly is for adults, on the Crown.
Under the presumptive offences regime, an adult 
sentence is presumed to apply and the protection of 
a publication ban is presumed to be lost. The 
impugned provisions place the onus on young persons 
to satisfy the court that they remain entitled to a 
youth sentence and to a publication ban. This onus 
on young persons is inconsistent with the 
presumption of diminished moral culpability, a 
principle of fundamental justice which requires the 
Crown to justify the loss both of a youth sentence 
and of a publication ban. [paras. 93-95]
As for the sentence in this case, it was upheld and the 
publication ban remained in effect. 
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Minority View
The minority agreed that young persons are entitled, 
based on their reduced maturity and judgment, to a 
presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness and 
that this presumption was a principle of fundamental 
justice. They did not, however, agree that this 
presumption lead to the further presumption of a 
youth sentence or a publication ban. The YCJA 
presumption for adult sentences and publication for 
serious violent offences does not preclude the 
imposition of a a youth sentence or a publication ban 
where considered appropriate. Justice Rothstein, 
writing the minority judgment, stated:
I do not agree…that the publication and sentencing 
provisions create a reverse onus which contravenes 
the principle of fundamental justice requiring that 
the Crown bear the burden of proving aggravating 
sentencing circumstances. First, even though the 
legislative scheme treats a publication ban as part 
of the sentence for appeal purposes, the potential 
publication is neither state imposed nor part of the 
young person’s sentence in fact. Second, the 
impugned provisions in no way relieve the Crown of 
its burden of proving all aggravating facts on 
sentencing. In effect, the presumptive sentencing 
regime simply provides for a higher range of 
sentences for young persons convicted of the most 
serious violent offences. Even so, Parliament has 
provided young offenders with the opportunity to 
satisfy the youth justice court that the 
presumptive higher range of sentence or the 
presumptive publication should not apply. Providing 
this opportunity to young offenders, especially 
when the sentencing judge is required to prompt 
young offenders to take advantage of the 
opportunity, represents Parliament’s approach to 
balance the status of young offenders with the 
need to protect society from the perpetrators of 
the most serious violent crimes. It does not place a 
“persuasive burden” on young offenders that 
eliminates the Crown’s burden of establishing 
aggravating sentencing factors. [para. 109]
The Crown’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
Note-able Quote 
“When you have police officers who abuse citizens, 
you erode public confidence in law enforcement. That 
makes the job of good police officers unsafe.” - Mary 
Frances Berry
DESPITE EXTREMELY SERIOUS 
CHARTER BREACHES, EVIDENCE 
ADMITTED
R. v. Harrison, 2008 ONCA 85
A police officer saw a Dodge Durango 
without a front licence plate and 
decided to stop it. When he activated 
his emergency lights and manoeuvred in 
behind the vehicle he noticed it had an Alberta rear 
licence plate and realized it did not require a front 
one. He nonetheless decided to stop the vehicle to 
maintain his “integrity”—he already had his emergency 
lights on and had begun the stop. He then also wanted 
to check to see if the driver was eligible to drive in 
Ontario.    
  
There were two men in the vehicle. The officer asked 
the accused for his licence and vehicle registration, 
insurance and rental agreement. The accused looked 
for but was unable to produce his licence. During the 
encounter the officer noted the vehicle looked lived-
in—it was messy and littered with used food and drink 
containers— and there was clothing and bags on the 
back seat and two boxes in the rear compartment. And 
both occupants provided different versions of their 
association. After conducting computer checks, the 
officer learned the accused’s drivers licence had been 
suspended and he was arrested for that offence.  The 
officer decided to search the vehicle as an incident to 
the arrest because the accused hadn’t “identified 
himself properly” and the officer believed the 
accused’s driver’s licence could be within the vehicle. 
For safety reasons the officer asked the occupants if 
there were drugs or weapons inside the vehicle. He 
didn’t want to get pricked by a needle or pull a trigger 
on a handgun when searching. His suspicions were also 
aroused from his training and experience, including a 
Drug Interdiction Course, that there could possibly be 
drugs, weapons, cash or a combination thereof inside 
the vehicle. Both men responded in the negative to the 
officer’s questions about the presence of drugs or 
weapons. The officer searched the rental vehicle and 
found 77 pounds of cocaine with a street value of 
between $2,463,000 and $4,575,000 in the two boxes 
located in the rear area. The men were arrested  for 
possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.  
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At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice on a 
charge of trafficking, the accused argued his Charter 
rights were breached and he sought to have the 
evidence excluded. The judge found the officer 
breached ss.8 and 9 of the Charter. He held the men 
were arbitrarily detained and that the search of the 
vehicle was unreasonable.  In his view, the officer did 
not have reasonable grounds to stop and search the 
car and knew it. He found that the officer’s 
explanation for stopping the vehicle and detaining its 
occupants was contrived and defied credibility.   The 
search of the vehicle after arrest was not “truly 
incidental” to the arrest for driving while under 
suspension and the officer’s stated purpose for the 
search was certainly not reasonable. The officer’s 
actions were flagrant, brazen, not committed in good 
faith, and the Charter breaches were extremely 
serious. However, the judge refused to exclude the 
cocaine under s.24(2) because trial fairness was not 
compromised and the Charter breaches “pale in 
comparison to the criminality involved in the 
possession for the purposes of distribution of 77 
pounds of cocaine, if such is proven.” The accused was 
convicted and sentenced to five years of in prison.
  
The accused then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing the trial judge erred in his s. 24(2) 
analysis. Justice O’Connor, authoring the majority 
opinion, disagreed. He first noted several 
considerations concerning s.24(2).
• It “was written to constitute an intermediate 
position between the automatic exclusionary rule 
familiar to American Bill of Rights jurisprudence 
and the automatic inclusionary rule of the common 
law for non-conscriptive real evidence.” 
• Its main purpose “is to protect the reputation of 
the administration of justice” and “‘is not a remedy 
for police misconduct.’ Because the application of s. 
24(2) focuses on the reputation of the 
administration of justice, the views of the 
community at large are relevant. That is not to say 
that courts should always rely on the actual views 
of the community. Such a populist approach would 
risk subjecting the Charter to the volatile ebb and 
flow of majority sentiment and would thus arguably 
run counter to the very idea of constitutionally 
entrenched rights.  That said, the question of 
disrepute is not to be analyzed solely from the 
perspective of judges or the legal community.  The 
standard is that of the reasonable person, and … 
‘[t]he reasonable person is usually the average 
person in the community, but only when that 
community’s current mood is reasonable.’   The 
reasonable person standard … ‘serves as a reminder 
to each individual judge that his discretion is 
grounded in community values.’”
• “Section 24(2) directs judges to consider ‘all the 
circumstances’ in determining whether a Charter 
violation mandates exclusion.  The court in Collins 
chose to divide the factors involved in this inquiry 
into three categories: those relating to the effects 
of the breach on trial fairness, those relating to 
the seriousness of the constitutional breach, and 
those relating to the effect of excluding the 
evidence on the reputation of the administration of 
justice.  Ultimately, however, the question is 
whether admitting the evidence would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute.” [paras. 
29-32] 
As well, a trial judge’s decision to exclude or admit 
evidence under s. 24(2) is subject to considerable 
deference and should not be interfered with unless 
there is a clear legal error or it is unreasonable. 
 
In this case the admission of the cocaine would not 
result in an unfair trial. And although the trial judge 
ruled the breaches “extremely serious”—the officer’s 
conduct was “brazen and flagrant” and “the search was 
not conducted in good faith”—they were not the most 
egregious category of Charter violations. The officer 
did not have a carefully thought out plan or practice 
to breach the Charter.  He suspected that there were 
drugs in the car and his on-the-scene decision to 
follow his suspicions without reasonable grounds was a 
serious mistake.  However, by the time the car was 
searched it was arguable the officer had enough 
information to warrant a search even though he 
agreed that he did not have enough information to 
obtain a warrant.  This was a flawed decision making 
process rather than a more planned and premeditated 
course of action. The detention was brief—about 15 
minutes between the start of the traffic stop and the 
accused’s arrest for driving with a suspended licence—
and no physical force or restraint was used. And 
further, the accused’s privacy interest was not great.  
This was not a search of a person, a residence or an 
office, but only a car. With this in mind, Justice 
O’Connor stated:  
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The courts have held that an individual’s privacy 
interest in a vehicle and its contents – a factor not 
mentioned in the trial judge’s ruling on the voir dire 
– are lower than the privacy interest in a person’s 
body, home or office. In this case, the vehicle was 
a rental vehicle.  The [accused] was not the lessee.  
He was properly arrested for driving while under 
suspension. Moreover, the [accused] did not testify 
in the voir dire about any perceived violation of his 
privacy interest. He did not even look to make sure 
his own bags were in the vehicle’s rear compartment 
prior to leaving Vancouver.   Indeed, he told [the 
officer] that the boxes belonged to [his 
passenger].   This denial of ownership is an 
important factor.  [references omitted, para. 45]  
The majority concluded that the effects of the 
Charter breaches under ss. 8 and 9 were relatively 
minor. 
Further, the trail judge did not err in 
analyzing the effect of admitting or 
excluding the evidence on the reputation 
of the administration of justice. In this 
stage of the analysis, courts consider 
the serious of the offence, the 
reliability of the evidence, and its 
importance to the case. The charges 
were very serious and there was no case 
without the drugs.  
Nor did the majority accept the 
accused’s argument that admitting the evidence would 
amount to judicial condonation of police misconduct.  
Just because a trial judge admits evidence does not 
mean they are condoning the Charter breaches. “The 
very nature of s. 24(2) contemplates that judges will 
admit evidence in some cases where there has been a 
breach of the Charter, but the exclusion of evidence 
would bring the administration of justice into greater 
disrepute than its admission,” said Justice O’Connor. 
Instead, the trial judge clearly condemned the police 
misconduct in this case despite admitting the 
evidence. Section 24(2) involves a balancing test with 
no single factor trumping all others. “Police conduct is 
rarely determinative of the s.24(2) analysis,” 
continued Justice O’Connor. “A trial judge engaged in 
a proper s.24(2) analysis can find serious police 
misconduct and, because of other factors in play, 
legitimately admit the evidence improperly obtained.” 
The majority stated:
When considering whether admitting the evidence 
would bring the system into disrepute, it is 
important to bear in mind that the police 
misconduct was not shown to be systemic in nature 
or the result of an operational policy or guidelines 
or even an order from a senior officer.  While 
clearly the misconduct was serious, the actions 
involved were those of one police officer, who had 
been on the force for four years. That officer made 
some flawed decisions during the roadside 
encounter and later when testifying.  However, this 
is not a case where it has been shown that there is 
or even might be an institutional problem.  
Furthermore … s.24(2) of the Charter is not 
intended as a remedy for police misconduct.
As the trial judge recognized, police conduct is but 
one factor in the s. 24(2) analysis. The wording of 
s. 24(2) and all of the leading cases over 20 years 
compel trial judges to engage in 
an analysis of many factors 
under the Collins analytical 
framework.  There is rarely an 
automatic equation between 
police misconduct and exclusion 
of the evidence.  
By way of illustration, had the 
police officer in this case 
engaged in more egregious 
conduct, such as entering the 
[accused’s] home without a 
warrant, or threatening or 
assaulting the [accused], that 
may well have tipped the balance in favour of 
exclusion.   The same holds true in terms of the 
nature and quantity of the drugs seized – a small 
amount of marijuana may well have yielded a 
different result.  In our view, this is precisely the 
dichotomy of result that s. 24(2) envisions and that 
Collins and its progeny permit. [paras. 60-62]
And further:
There is no doubt that the present case involved 
the interprovincial transport of a very large amount 
of cocaine.  The seized cocaine was estimated to be 
worth between $2,463,000 and $4,575,000.   The 
traffickers stood to profit handsomely from the 
long chain of social ills that would have flowed from 
the sale of 77 pounds of cocaine.  
In our view, a reasonable member of the community 
could very well find that excluding from evidence 
such a large quantum of drugs as a result of the 
police action in this case would bring the 
“[P]olice conduct is but one 
factor in the s.24(2) 
analysis. The wording of s.24(2) 
and all of the leading cases over 
20 years compel trial judges to 
engage in an analysis of many 
factors... There is rarely an 
automatic equation between 
police misconduct and exclusion 
of the evidence.”
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administration of justice into greater disrepute 
than admitting the seized narcotics.
………
Thus … we believe that without minimizing the 
seriousness of the police officer’s conduct or in any 
way condoning it, it was open to the trial judge to 
find that reasonable members of the community 
could well conclude that the exclusion of 77 pounds 
of cocaine, with a street value of several millions of 
dollars and the potential to cause serious grief and 
misery to many, would bring the administration of 
justice into greater disrepute than would its 
admission. [paras. 67-70]
A Different View
Justice Cronk, writing a dissenting opinion, concluded 
the evidence should have been excluded. In his view, 
the Charter violations were not only very serious but 
also intentional. The police officer knew that he did 
not have reasonable and probable grounds to stop the 
car or search it, but did so anyways. “This is not a case 
where a police officer made a good faith error in 
judgment, misunderstood the extent of his authority, 
engaged in trivial or inadvertent constitutional 
violations, or is being held to an unduly harsh 
assessment with the benefit of hindsight,” said 
Justice Cronk.  “This is a case where the police 
officer’s actions, both at the time of the detention … 
and the search … were deliberate, without legal 
justification, and disdainful of the rights and 
freedoms protected by the Charter.”   He also noted 
that the officer tried to mislead the trial judge about 
his conduct.  Justice Cronk would have allowed the 
appeal, set aside the accused’s conviction and entered 
an acquittal. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
THE MENTAL SIDE OF FITNESS 
TRAINING
Insp. Kelly Keith, Atlantic Police Academy
Whether you want to do your best at losing 10 lbs, 
completing your first triathlon, or competing in a high 
level sporting event, the formula for success is very 
similar. Here are a few points to remember if you want 
to perform your best.
You Must Be Focused
The body/mind connection of physical activity (or 
anything else for that matter) cannot and should not 
be overlooked.  When you are in the gym or out jogging 
you must be focused. If you are not focused and/or 
don’t want to be there you are not going to be your 
best!  Your performance in sports will be dramatically 
improved if you enjoy it, you look forward to going, you 
look forward to the great feeling afterwards, or are 
even feeling great about the results. Focus on some 
short-term goals, enjoy what you’re doing, know why 
you want to do it, and go for it.  
Ensure You Have The Appropriate Intensity 
Intensity is a required ingredient to get better at 
running, swimming or even eking out the last reps on 
the bench press.  It is that simple.  Also knowing when 
and how to turn on and off this intensity is required.  
Get intense and go for it on the last reps or last miles 
if you want to perform your best!
You Must Believe In Yourself 
Believe 100% and nothing less.  If you don’t believe you 
can achieve what you’re aiming to do, there is no point 
in doing it!  If you are telling yourself you are “not that 
good”, it makes no difference how much natural talent 
you have. You will live up to your expectations and be 
“not that good”. On the other hand, if you tell yourself 
that you can “do it” and believe in your ability to “do 
it”, you will “do it”. All this obviously put in perspective 
and what you are trying to achieve is achievable!
Don’t Be Afraid To Fail
Fear of failure is a performance killer. You will only 
grow as an athlete by failing!  Babe Ruth struck out 
more than anyone else the same year he set the home 
run record. How many people care how many times he 
struck out?  When attempting any activity there will 
be failures – you have a choice as to how to look at 
those failures.  You can learn from them which makes 
you stronger and better for the next time or you can 
get frustrated, not try again, or even quit. Not a lot 
more has to be said about this topic, however it is a 
shame that people do not hit their home runs because 
they afraid to strike out.  
Have Faith
You need to believe in yourself and surround yourself 
with people that believe in you.  Find a comrade that 
you know will encourage you and be a positive impact 
on you and tell them your goals. This cannot be 
overlooked.  Someone who is positive towards your 
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goals, believes in you and will assist you in achieving 
your goals will greatly enhance your chances in 
attaining those goals, not to mention get you on track 
if you sway off every now and then.
Fitness Tip That Works - Count down your reps which 
is far more motivating than counting up. Give it a try 
and see what you think!
About the Author - Insp. Kelly Keith is a 20 year 
veteran of law enforcement. He presently teaches 
Physical Training, Use of Force and Tactical Firearms 
to Corrections, Law and Security, Conservation 
Officers and Police Cadets at the Atlantic Police 
Academy. Kelly is a second degree black belt in Jiu-
Jitsu and a Certified Personal Trainer, Strength and 
Conditioning Instructor, and a Certified Sports 
Nutrition Specialist. He can be reached by email at 
KKeith@pei.sympatico.ca 
‘STRADDLE EVIDENCE’ DID NOT 
REBUT OVER 80mg% 
PRESUMPTION
R. v. Gibson, R. v. MacDonald, 2008 SCC 16 
A fragmented Supreme Court of Canada 
has ruled that straddle evidence 
presented by experts in two over 80mg% 
trials was insufficient to rebut the 
presumption of identity found in s.258(1) of the 
Criminal Code. 
Facts: R. v. Gibson
A police officer saw Gibson driving his all-terrain 
vehicle on the highway and stopped him. Gibson’s 
breath smelled of alcohol and his speech was slurred. 
The officer administered two breathalyzer tests, 
which indicated that Gibson’s blood alcohol content 
(BAC) was 120mg% and 100mg%. Gibson was charged 
with operating a vehicle over 80mg% contrary to 
s.253(b) of the Criminal Code.
At trial in Nova Scotia Provincial Court Gibson 
testified he consumed ten beers over a period of 
seven hours and five of them shortly before being 
stopped by the police. An expert witness testifying 
for the defence said that Gibson’s BAC would have 
been between 40mg% and 105mg% when stopped, 
based on the average alcohol elimination rates of men 
of his age, height and weight and assuming the 
pattern of consumption testified to was accurate. 
The trial judge accepted Gibson’s and the expert’s 
evidence, found the presumption in s.258(1)(d.1) of 
the Criminal Code had been rebutted, and was left 
with a reasonable doubt that Gibson’s BAC exceeded 
the legal limit. He was acquitted.  
The Crown appealed to the Nova Scotia Supreme 
Court arguing that expert evidence based on 
elimination rates in the general population could not 
constitute evidence to the contrary. The appeal court 
justice ruled that rejecting evidence of elimination 
rates in the general population would amount to making 
the presumption an irrebutable one. Thus, Gibson’s 
acquittal was upheld. On further appeal, the Nova 
Scotia Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and 
ordered a new trial.  It ruled that an expert opinion 
based on average tendencies of the population was 
without foundation and thus inadmissible. The Court 
found the hypothetical elimination rates were not 
capable of rebutting the presumption in s. 258(1)(d.1).
Facts: R. v. Macdonald
A police officer stopped MacDonald at a check stop. 
The officer noted MacDonald smelled of alcohol, was 
talking in a deliberate manner and had some difficulty 
walking. Two breath tests produced readings of 
146mg% and the he was charged with operating a 
vehicle while his BAC exceeded 80mg%, contrary to 
s.253(b). 
At trial in Alberta Provincial Court MacDonald 
testified that he had consumed six cans of beer over 
four and a half hours and had consumed the last can 
five minutes before being stopped by the police. An 
expert witness testified he tested MacDonald several 
months after he was charged and found his elimination 
rate to be 18.5 mg per hour. Assuming MacDonald 
eliminated alcohol at the same rate on the night of the 
offence, his BAC would have been 71mg% — below the 
legal limit. However, during the expert’s test, the type 
and pattern of alcohol consumption and the amount of 
food  consumed was not re-created. Furthermore, the 
expert stated that a man of MacDonald’s age, height 
and weight who eliminated alcohol at an average rate 
would have had a BAC of 64mg% and 109mg% at the 
time of driving. The trial judge ruled the expert 
evidence did not tend to show that Macdonald’s BAC 
had not exceeded 80mg% and convicted him. 
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On appeal, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench upheld 
the conviction, concluding the  evidence of a range of 
possible blood alcohol levels lying both below and 
above the legal limit was speculative and was not 
probative of MacDonald’s BAC at the time of the 
offence. The Alberta Court of Appeal upheld the 
lower judgments, stating that evidence of BAC 
disregarding the personal characteristics of the 
accused at the time of the alleged offence 
constitutes an attack on the fictional nature of the 
presumption and is inadmissible. It rejected the use 
of average elimination rates and of straddle evidence 
based on elimination rates in the general population.
Both Gibson and MacDonald then appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Canada arguing that straddle 
evidence—expert opinion evidence stating that an 
accused’s BAC may have been over or may have been 
within the legal limit—is capable of rebutting the 
statutory presumption set out in s.258(1)(d.1).
The Quartet
Four judges (Justice Charron with Justices 
Bastarache, Abella, and Rothstein concurring) found 
the expert straddle evidence did not rebut the 
presumption and dismissed the appeals.  
Under s.253 it is a criminal 
offence for a person to 
operate a motor vehicle 
having consumed alcohol in 
such a quantity that the 
concentration in the person’s 
blood exceeds 80mg%, 
regardless of whether the 
person is actually impaired at 
the time. And the offence 
created by s.253(b) is not 
the quantity of alcohol 
consumed, but consumption 
resulting in a BAC exceeding 
80mg%. Parliament regards 
driving with this level of alcohol sufficient risk to 
warrant criminalization. Section 258(1) then 
establishes three evidentiary presumptions to 
simplify the prosecution of the offence of driving over 
the legal limit. These presumptions are “legal or 
evidentiary shortcuts designed to bridge difficult 
evidentiary gaps”.
Section 258(1)(g) contains the presumption of 
accuracy. It provides that a technician’s certificate 
stating the accused’s BAC at the time of the 
breathalyzer test is presumed to be accurate, in the 
absence of any evidence to the contrary. 
Section 258(1)(c) contains the first presumption of 
identity. It states that where breath alcohol samples 
have been taken in accordance with certain technical 
requirements, the accused’s BAC at the time of the 
breathalyzer test is presumed to be the same as their 
BAC at the time of the alleged offence, in the absence 
of evidence to the contrary. Section 258(1)(d.1) 
contains a second presumption of identity. It states 
that where the breathalyzer test produces a reading 
above 80mg%, the accused’s BAC is presumed to have 
exceeded 80mg% at the time of the alleged offence, 
absent evidence tending to show the accused’s BAC 
did not in fact exceed 80mg%. In order to rebut the 
statutory presumptions of identity, an accused whose 
breathalyzer reading exceeds 80mg% must show that 
their BAC was different at the time of driving than at 
the time of the test and also that their BAC did not 
exceed 80mg% at the time of the alleged offence. The 
standard of proof required to rebut the statutory 
presumptions is reasonable doubt. 
Justice Charron examined the three approaches to 
straddle evidence: 
1) the Heideman line of analysis. Straddle evidence 
can never rebut the presumption in s. 258(1)(d.1). 
Rather, the entire range of hypothetical values 
must fall below 80 mg% for the presumption to be 
set aside. 
2) the “prevailing direction” approach. Some courts 
have accepted that straddle evidence can rebut 
the statutory presumption if the accused’s range 
of possible BACs is more below the legal limit than 
above. Does the range of possibilities have a 
leaning or prevailing direction which makes it clear 
that the accused’s BAC was not over 80mg%? If it 
does, or if the Court is left with a reasonable 
doubt on the issue, then the evidence amounts to 
“evidence to the contrary” and the presumption is 
disarmed.
.08 Over 80mg%
Range
Straddle evidence — 
expert opinion evidence 
which says that the 
accused’s blood alcohol 
concentration may have 
been over or may have 
been within the legal 
limit at the material 
time; the range of 
possible blood alcohol 
concentrations straddles 
the legal limit of 80 mg 
of alcohol per 100 ml of 
blood.
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3) the “some evidence” approach. It is sufficient for 
the accused to point to evidence which tends to 
show that their BAC could have been below 80mg% 
at the time of the alleged offence. There is no 
need for an accused to demonstrate that their  
BAC is actually below 80mg%. It is only necessary 
to adduce credible evidence tending to show that 
it is possible under the circumstances. 
After reviewing these three approaches, Justice 
Charron concluded that straddle evidence is “simply an 
attack on the presumption itself and that it cannot 
constitute evidence ‘tending to show’ that the 
accused’s blood alcohol level did not exceed 80 mg at 
the material time”: 
[I]t is my view that in all cases straddle evidence 
merely constitutes an attempt to defeat the 
statutory presumption itself and, as such, does not 
tend to show that the accused’s blood alcohol 
concentration did not exceed the legal limit at the 
time of the alleged offence within the meaning of s. 
258(1)(d.1). I also conclude, on the basis of the 
undisputed scientific fact that absorption and 
elimination rates vary continuously, that post-
offence testing of the accused’s own elimination 
rate will rarely, if ever, add anything of value to the 
expert opinion evidence and, for obvious policy 
reasons, should not be encouraged, let alone 
required.
It is undisputed that the human body absorbs and 
eliminates alcohol over time, and that absorption 
and elimination rates vary, not only from person to 
person, but also from time to time for the same 
individual, depending on a number of factors, some 
of which concern the person’s digestive process at 
the relevant time. It is therefore impossible to 
ascertain the precise rate at which the accused was 
metabolizing alcohol at the time of the alleged 
offence. Parliament can be assumed to have known 
that blood alcohol levels are subject to these 
inherent variations. Yet, it saw fit to implement the 
presumption. The legislative scheme must be 
interpreted in this context.
Because absorption and elimination rates continually 
vary, it is readily apparent that a breathalyzer 
reading of 95 mg, for example, may not reflect the 
actual concentration of alcohol in the accused’s 
blood at the time of the alleged offence — it would 
depend on the rate at which the particular accused 
is metabolizing the alcohol during the relevant time 
period on the day in question. Yet, it can be no 
defence for an accused to say that the actual 
alcohol concentration at the material time may have 
been less than the legal limit based on this variable 
alone. To admit such a defence would obviously fly 
in the face of the presumption itself. It is because 
of these inherent variations in absorption and 
elimination rates that the presumption of identity is 
needed in the first place. In order to facilitate 
proof of the offence, the presumption treats all 
persons as one person with a fixed rate of 
elimination and absorption.
Straddle evidence puts the accused in no better 
position. It merely confirms that the accused falls 
into the category of drivers targeted by Parliament 
— namely, those who drive having consumed enough 
alcohol to reach a blood alcohol concentration 
exceeding 80 mg. Parliament, in creating this 
offence, clearly regarded driving with this level of 
.08 Over 80mg%
Range
.08 Over 80mg%
Range
up to 2 hours
Time of Driving Time of Test
• BAC at time of driving same as BAC at time of test (s.258(1)(c) CC)
• if BAC > 80mg% at time of test, then BAC at time of driving >80mg% (s.258(1)(d.1) CC)
Presumptions of Identity
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consumption as posing sufficient risk to warrant 
criminalization. It is therefore not enough to show, 
based on evidence about the accused’s pattern of 
consumption of alcohol during the relevant time 
period, that the accused consumed enough alcohol to 
exceed the legal limit, albeit in a quantity that would 
place him within a range that may be somewhat 
different than that which could be extrapolated 
from the breathalyzer reading. It is clear from the 
wording of s.258(1)(d.1) that the presumption can 
only be rebutted by evidence that tends to show 
that the accused’s blood alcohol concentration did 
not exceed the legal limit and, hence, that the 
accused was not in the targeted category of drivers.
In order to displace the presumption, the evidence 
must show, therefore, that based on the amount of 
alcohol consumed, the accused’s blood alcohol 
concentration would not have been above the legal 
limit at the time of driving, regardless of how fast 
or slow the accused may have been metabolizing 
alcohol on the day in question. Of course, the court 
need not be convinced of that fact. It is sufficient 
if the evidence raises a reasonable doubt.
Further, because it is scientifically undisputed that 
absorption and elimination rates can vary from time 
to time, nothing is really gained by post-offence 
testing of an accused’s elimination rate. Short of 
reproducing the exact same conditions that existed 
at the time of the offence, assuming this is even 
possible, any expert opinion evidence based on actual 
tests would have to be given with the qualification 
that absorption and elimination rates vary from time 
to time, and therefore the accused’s blood alcohol 
level at the material time cannot be measured with 
precision. Ultimately, the best evidence an expert 
can provide, as the expert opinion evidence adduced 
in Mr. MacDonald’s case exemplifies, is likely to be a 
range reflecting average elimination rates. In any 
event, it is my view that this Court should not 
interpret this legislative scheme, which is intended 
to combat the social evils resulting from drinking 
and driving, as requiring accused persons, some of 
whom may well be battling with alcohol addiction, to 
submit to drinking tests in order to make out a 
defence. Surely, Parliament cannot have so intended. 
[paras. 3-8]
And further:
[I]t cannot be disputed that the presumption is a 
legal fiction and that a breathalyzer reading that 
exceeds the legal limit may not be reflective of the 
actual concentration of alcohol in the accused’s 
blood at the time of the offence because it always 
depends on the rate at which the particular accused 
is metabolizing the alcohol during the relevant time 
period on the day in question. Yet the offence is 
clearly made out. The breathalyzer test provides 
legal proof that the accused “consumed alcohol in 
such a quantity” that it put him or her over 80 mg 
contrary to s. 253 of the Criminal Code. The accused 
cannot rebut the presumption by relying on inherent 
variations in absorption and elimination rates. 
Straddle evidence puts the accused in no better 
position. Evidence that merely confirms that alcohol 
was consumed in a sufficient quantity to produce a 
blood alcohol concentration that exceeds the 
prescribed limit, whether or not it be within the same
range that could be extrapolated from the 
breathalyzer reading, cannot rebut the presumption 
under s. 258(1)(d.1). When considered in this sense, 
straddle evidence, in effect, is tantamount to 
arguing, for example, that the accused should not be
convicted because he or she only drank a sufficient 
quantity of alcohol to reach a 90-mg concentration 
rather than a 95-mg concentration as recorded by 
the breathalyzer. Parliament, by creating this 
offence, clearly regarded driving with this level of
consumption as posing sufficient risk to warrant 
criminalization. To hold otherwise would be to 
defeat the presumption itself and it cannot be 
allowed. [para. 32]
In these cases, the expert opinion evidence placed the 
accuseds’ BAC both above and below the legal limit at 
the time of driving. It did no more than confirm that 
the accused fell within the category of drivers 
targeted by Parliament and did not rebut the statutory
presumption under s. 258(1)(d.1) of the Criminal Code. 
The Trio
Three judges (Justice Lebel with Justices McLachlin 
and Fish concurring) concluded that, depending on a 
number of factors, straddle evidence may or may not 
provide a sufficiently probative evidentiary basis to 
rebut the presumption arising from the accused’s 
failure of the breathalyzer test. In their view, both 
expert evidence of alcohol elimination rates in the 
general population and straddle evidence can be 
relevant and are therefore not inherently inadmissible 
for the purpose of rebutting the presumption. 
However, the probative value of such evidence will 
often be so low, as were the cases here, that it was not 
sufficient to rebut the s.258(1)(d.1) presumption.
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Justice Lebel described the purpose and effect of the 
presumptions as follows:
Under s. 258(1)(g), blood alcohol tests are presumed 
to be accurate, provided that certain procedures 
are followed. This presumption, as well as the 
presumption established under s. 258(1)(c), was 
adopted by Parliament after a review of the 
scientific evidence then available about the 
reliability of the tests and their fairness to the 
accused. It is known as the presumption of accuracy 
[and  is rebuttable on] evidence to the contrary 
[tending] to show that the blood alcohol content of 
the accused did not exceed the legal limit at the 
time of the breathalyzer test. Otherwise, one is 
only challenging the presumption itself without 
providing any exculpatory evidence.
Under s. 258(1)(c), the blood alcohol content of the 
accused while he or she was driving is presumed to 
have been the same as at the time a blood alcohol 
test was administered, provided that certain 
procedures were followed and “in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary”. This is often referred to 
as the presumption of (temporal) identity. Like s. 
258(1)(g), s. 258(1)(c) does not specify whether 
rebutting the presumption requires evidence that 
the accused was not over the legal limit or whether 
evidence of mere difference over time will suffice….
[Section 258(1)(d.1) establishes] the presumption 
that, in the absence of evidence tending to show 
that the accused had a blood alcohol content of 80 
mg or less while driving, a blood alcohol analysis 
indicating a result of over 80 mg is proof that the 
accused had a blood alcohol content of over 80 mg 
while driving. The presumption provided for in s. 
258(1)(d.1) has been referred to as an “additional” 
presumption of identity… [I]t applies regardless of 
whether the accused is challenging the accuracy of 
the blood alcohol test or the presumption of 
identity. This is because s. 258(1)(d.1) applies even 
if the requirements of s. 258(1)(g) are met. For 
example, let us consider the case of an accused who 
rebuts the presumption of accuracy in s. 258(1)(g) 
with evidence both that his or her blood alcohol 
content at the time of the breathalyzer test was 
different than that indicated by the machine (as 
required by s. 258(1)(g)) and that it did not exceed 
the legal limit at the time of testing (as required by 
the common law). In such a situation, s. 258(1)(d.1) 
will nevertheless apply, which means that the 
accused must also prove that his or her blood 
alcohol content did not exceed the legal limit at the 
time of the alleged offence in order to rebut the 
presumption. [paras. 48-50]
The presumption found in s.258(1)(d.1) can be 
rebutted by adducing evidence tending to show that 
the concentration of alcohol in the blood of the 
accused did not exceed 80mg% at the time the 
offence was committed. An accused need not prove 
that the blood-alcohol level of the accused did not 
exceed the statutory limit at the relevant time.  
Rather, evidence to the contrary is evidence that is 
capable of raising a reasonable doubt as to the 
presumed fact. Straddle evidence and evidence based 
on alcohol elimination rates in the general population is 
not inherently inadmissible for the purpose of 
rebutting the presumptions in s.258(1). However, in 
the absence of evidence tending to show that the BAC 
of the accused at the time of the offence was below 
the legal limit, that evidence will rarely have sufficient 
probative value to rebut the presumptions.
For expert opinion evidence to be admissible it must 
be, among other things, relevant. For the expert 
evidence to be relevant, it must relate to a fact in 
issue in the trial, tend to prove it, and its probative 
value must outweigh its prejudicial effect. In Justice 
Lebels view, expert evidence of alcohol elimination 
rates and BAC in respect of the general population was 
not inherently inadmissible and could be given some 
weight. The experts in these cases testified as to 
what the BAC of a person of each accused’s age, sex, 
height and weight would have been if they eliminated 
alcohol at a rate within the range of the general 
population and their consumption pattern, which had a 
foundation in the evidence. However, the probative 
value of evidence based on rates in the general 
population will often be so low that it fails to raise a 
reasonable doubt that the accused had a blood alcohol 
content exceeding 80mg%, as indicated by an approved 
instrument for measuring BAC. Elimination rates vary 
between individuals and each individual’s rate will vary 
depending on such factors as  the amount of food 
consumed, the type of alcohol consumed, and the 
pattern of consumption. 
Expert evidence of the elimination rate of a particular 
accused as established by a test, as opposed to the 
elimination rate of the general population, is 
potentially more probative of their BAC while driving. 
However, because an individual’s elimination rate 
varies over time based on a number of factors, the 
probative value of evidence based on the elimination 
rate of the accused will depend on the number of 
variables controlled for in the elimination rate test. 
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And evidence of the elimination rate of an accused at 
the time of the offence, would be more likely to rebut 
the presumption in s.258(1)(d.1) than mere evidence of 
the elimination rate of the accused under testing 
conditions.
As for straddle evidence—evidence of a range of blood 
alcohol levels whose lowest value lies below the legal 
limit and whose highest value lies above it—Justice 
Lebel held it too could be relevant for the purpose of 
rebutting a presumption that the BAC of the accused 
was above 80mg%. Although not conclusive, it could be 
capable of raising a reasonable doubt, depending on 
where the ranges straddled the legal limit. “A wide 
‘straddle range’, such as those in the present appeals 
(40-105 mg for Mr. Gibson and 64-109 mg for Mr. 
MacDonald), cannot be considered evidence to the 
contrary of the breathalyzer result, since it does not 
tend to prove that the accused was at or under the 
legal limit. Similarly, a range that is overwhelmingly 
above the legal limit may be of limited probative 
value,” said Justice Lebel “A narrower range, or one 
whose values lie overwhelmingly below the legal limit, 
will generally have greater probative value. In the end, 
the more that is known about probabilities within the 
range, the more probative the evidence may be.” He 
continued:
Another factor going to weight is whether the 
breathalyzer result is consistent with the straddle 
range. If it is, the Crown can argue that the 
straddle evidence supports the breathalyzer result. 
Although such evidence would be admissible, it is 
difficult to imagine that it could leave the trier of 
fact with a reasonable doubt. If, on the other hand, 
the breathalyzer result is inconsistent with the 
straddle range, this is simply another factor to be 
considered by the trier of fact. It could support 
either the contention that the breathalyzer reading 
was inaccurate, or the contention that the expert’s 
testimony is poor evidence of the actual blood 
alcohol content of the accused while he or she was 
driving. That being said, it should be recalled that in 
cases where an accused may have continued to 
absorb alcohol between the time of the alleged 
offence and that of the breathalyzer test, the 
breathalyzer reading may be consistent with the 
straddle range even if it lies outside the range.
In sum, straddle evidence is by its very nature 
consistent with both innocence and guilt. 
Accordingly, such evidence will rarely suffice on its 
own to raise a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy 
of a breathalyzer result admitted in accordance 
with the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code. 
For the reasons given, however, it is not inadmissible 
on that ground. Evidence that does not in itself tend 
to show that the blood alcohol ratio of the accused 
was at or under the legal limit cannot be excluded 
for that reason. Here as elsewhere, ultimate 
sufficiency and threshold admissibility are 
conceptually distinct issues. Once straddle evidence 
is admitted, it will be left to the trier of fact to 
determine whether that evidence, considered in 
light of the evidence as a whole, raises a reasonable 
doubt as to the accuracy of the breathalyzer result. 
And I hasten to add that the straddle evidence and 
the other evidence relied on by the defence will 
warrant an acquittal only if it tends to prove that 
the blood alcohol level of the accused at the 
relevant time did not exceed 80 mg. In cases where 
the range of possible blood alcohol levels is based on 
average elimination rates across the population as a 
whole, straddle evidence will rarely be sufficient in 
itself to raise a reasonable doubt about the 
presumed fact that the blood alcohol level of the 
accused exceeded the legal limit. It nevertheless 
remains admissible for the reasons given and may, 
bearing in mind the evidence as a whole, constitute 
evidence to the contrary for the purpose of 
rebutting the presumption in s. 258(1)(d.1). 
Whether a reasonable doubt exists must be 
assessed in light of all the evidence, given that the 
Crown has adduced evidence, in the form of a 
breathalyzer test result, of a blood alcohol content 
over the legal limit at the time of the offence. 
[paras. 74-75]
Here, the expert evidence in Gibson’s case was 
sufficiently relevant to be admissible and was not 
without foundation, so it could be given weight. 
However, because the expert’s straddle evidence was 
based on elimination rates in the general population, 
and consisted of a wide range of values including values 
significantly above the legal limit, it did not rebut the 
s.258(1)(d.1) presumption by raising a reasonable 
doubt that his BAC actually exceeded 80mg%. The 
expert evidence in MacDonald’s case included straddle 
evidence based on elimination rates in the general 
population and evidence based on MacDonald’s own 
elimination rate according to tests conducted 
subsequent to the offence. This straddle evidence was 
admissible. However, the trial judge did not have a 
reasonable doubt that MacDonald’s BAC was over the 
limit at the relevant time and it would have been 
unreasonable for him to find that the straddle 
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evidence in this case was capable of raising a 
reasonable doubt.
The straddle evidence adduced in both cases failed to 
rebut the presumption and both appeals were 
dismissed. 
The Dissenting Duo
Two judges (Justice Deschamps with Justice Binnie) 
dissented. They would adopt the prevailing direction 
approach to straddle evidence. “Evidence that tends to 
show that the [BAC] of the accused at the time of 
interception did not exceed the legal limit based on an 
elimination rate of 15 mg per hour, or on the actual 
elimination rate of the accused according to test 
results, will suffice to raise a reasonable doubt,” 
stated Justice Deschamps: 
In my view, the prevailing direction approach can be 
used to justify an acquittal, because the evidence 
presented at trial need only raise a reasonable 
doubt. “[A] reasonable doubt is a doubt based on 
reason and common sense which must be logically 
based upon the evidence or lack of evidence”. 
…“[T]he ‘evidence to the contrary’ to which it refers 
must tend to show — but it need not prove — that 
the blood-alcohol level of the accused did not 
exceed the statutory limit at the relevant time. The 
exculpatory evidence, in other words, must have 
probative value, but it need not be so cogent as to 
persuade the court”. Therefore, when an accused 
adduces straddle evidence, that evidence need not 
prove his or her blood alcohol level at the time of 
interception. It is sufficient that the evidence 
tends to show that the blood alcohol level of the 
accused did not exceed the legal limit at the 
material time. [references omitted, para. 86]
In Gibson’s case the prevailing direction favoured a 
level that did not exceed the legal limit and an 
acquittal should have followed. Justice Deschamps 
would have allowed Gibson’s appeal, set aside the 
decision for a new trial, and restored the acquittal. In  
MacDonald’s case, Justice Deschamps would have 
allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.  
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
Note-able Quote
“It takes 8,460 bolts to assemble an automobile, and 
one nut to scatter it all over the road.” - author 
unknown
R. v. Gibson & MacDonald judgment grid
Judge(s) Could the straddle evidence 
in these cases rebut 
presumption of identity in 
s.258 CC ?
Power quote
Bastarache
Abella
Charron
Rothstein
No “[I]n all cases straddle evidence merely constitutes an attempt to defeat the statutory 
presumption itself and, as such, does not tend to show that the accused’s blood alcohol 
concentration did not exceed the legal limit at the time of the alleged offence within the 
meaning of s. 258(1)(d.1).”
McLachlin
Lebel
Fish
No, 
but straddle evidence is not 
inherently inadmissible and 
may sometimes rebut 
presumption
“In cases where the range of possible blood alcohol levels is based on average 
elimination rates across the population as a whole, straddle evidence will rarely be 
sufficient in itself to raise a reasonable doubt about the presumed fact that the blood 
alcohol level of the accused exceeded the legal limit. It nevertheless remains 
admissible for the reasons given and may, bearing in mind the evidence as a whole, 
constitute evidence to the contrary for the purpose of rebutting the presumption in s. 
258(1)(d.1).”
Binnie
Deschamps
Yes, “[W]hen an accused adduces straddle evidence, that evidence need not prove his or 
her blood alcohol level at the time of interception. It is sufficient that the evidence tends 
to show that the blood alcohol level of the accused did not exceed the legal limit at the 
material time.”
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REFERENCE TO EARLIER TAINTED 
STATEMENT FOULS FRESH START
R. v. Wittwer, 2008 SCC 33
A police officer questioned the accused 
about some sexual offences while he was 
in custody at a provincial correctional 
centre on an unrelated charge. The 
interview lasted 1 hour and 40 minutes during which 
the accused spoke about a sexual encounter involving 
two victims that occurred about three or four months 
earlier. Because the officer had failed to properly 
advise the accused of his right to 
counsel, the police decided to 
question him again.  
A different officer conducted a 
second interview over two months 
later. At this time the accused 
was properly informed of his right 
to counsel but no effort was made 
to enable him to contact his 
lawyer.  This interview was not 
videotaped and the audio 
recording was of poor 
quality.  Recognizing that this 
second statement was likely 
inadmissible, the police decided to 
question him a third time.  
Yet again a different officer conducted the third 
interview, about three months after the second one. 
This interview lasted almost five hours.  The officer 
informed the accused of his right to counsel and told 
him his decision whether to answer questions should 
not be influenced by anything he had previously said to 
other police officers. The officer did not acknowledge 
the contents of the earlier interviews because he 
wanted to sever any connection between them. The 
officer questioned the accused, but the accused 
persisted for more than four hours in refusing to 
discuss the matter.  The officer then acknowledged 
that he knew about the sexual encounter the accused 
described in the first interview.  He felt that it was 
the only way he could get the accused “to talk”.  The 
accused then immediately gave a statement, repeating 
what he had said in the earlier interviews.  
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court the accused 
was convicted on three counts of sexual interference. 
The judge found the officer’s purpose of the third 
interview was to obtain a statement independent from 
the two earlier tainted statements.  The judge 
acknowledged that the accused persisted in declining 
to talk until he knew the officer was aware of what he 
said earlier. However, the judge nonetheless found 
there was a “significant temporal separation” between 
the third and first statements.  And any causal 
connection between the two statements was weak. The 
statement was therefore admissible. An appeal to the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal was unsuccessful. 
The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada. 
A unanimous Supreme Court 
concluded that the third 
statement admitted by the trial 
judge was tainted by the earlier 
Charter breaches and therefore 
subject to exclusion under s.24(2). 
As part of the 24(2) analysis, the 
evidence must be obtained in a 
manner that infringed or denied 
any Charter rights. In deciding 
whether a statement was tainted 
by an earlier breach, Justice Fish, 
writing the Court’s opinion, put it 
this way:
In considering whether a statement is tainted by an 
earlier Charter breach, the courts have adopted a 
purposive and generous approach.  It is unnecessary 
to establish a strict causal relationship between the 
breach and the subsequent statement. The 
statement will be tainted if the breach and the 
impugned statement can be said to be part of the 
same transaction or course of conduct.  The 
required connection between the breach and the 
subsequent statement may be “temporal, 
contextual, causal or a combination of the three”.  
A connection that is merely “remote” or “tenuous” 
will not suffice.  [references omitted, para. 21]
Here, Justice Fish was satisfied the connection was 
temporal, causal, and to some extent contextual:
• Temporal—when the officer made mention of the 
the first inadmissible statement to the accused 
during the third interview, he immediately made a 
statement.  
• Causal—The third statement was elicited after 
more than four hours of resistance and only after 
reference to the first tainted statement.  
“The statement will be tainted if the 
breach and the impugned statement 
can be said to be part of the same 
transaction or course of 
conduct. The required connection 
between the breach and the 
subsequent statement may be 
‘temporal, contextual, causal or a 
combination of the three’.  A 
connection that is merely ‘remote’ or 
‘tenuous’ will not suffice.”
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• Contextual—Any prior gap between the first and 
third statements “was intentionally and explicitly 
bridged by [the] association of one with the other 
in the course of [the third interrogation]”. 
In Justice Fish’s view, although the officer attempted 
a permissible fresh start, it ended as an impermissible 
interrogation inseparably linked to its tainted past. 
The existence of the first statement was a substantial 
factor in the making of the third one. The connection 
between the the two was direct and obvious.  If the 
third interviewer had not said he was aware of what 
the accused said earlier, he would not have made the 
same incriminating admission. “What we have here, 
then, is not a suspect’s change of heart but an 
interrogator’s fatal change in strategy,” said Justice 
Fish:
The interrogating officer knew that the earlier 
statements had both been obtained in a manner that 
infringed the [accused’s] right to counsel under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  He 
evidently understood as well that his use of the 
prior statements in this third interrogation would 
jeopardize the admissibility of any admissions 
obtained as a consequence. That is why he refrained 
for more than four hours from invoking the prior 
statements though he believed…that this alone 
would get [the accused] to incriminate himself. 
[para. 4]
And further:
With a view to obtaining these incriminating 
admissions from the accused, the police knowingly 
and deliberately made use of an earlier statement 
that they themselves had obtained from the 
appellant in a manner that infringed his 
constitutional rights under the Charter.  This alone 
is sufficient to taint the subsequent statement and 
to cry out for its exclusion….  To hold otherwise is 
to invite the perception that the police are legally 
entitled to reap the benefit of their own 
infringements of a suspect’s constitutional rights.  
And this, in my view, would bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute. [reference omitted, 
para.26]
The accused’s third statement was therefore 
inadmissible under s.24(2). The accused’s appeal was 
allowed, his convictions were set aside, and a new trial 
was ordered.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
MERE PRESENCE AT SEARCH 
WARRANT LOCATION 
INSUFFICIENT FOR ARREST
R. v. Whitaker, 2008 BCCA 174
The police began a currency exchange 
investigation after receiving information 
that the tenant in the accused’s 
basement suite made several suspicious 
transactions involving the conversion of American 
currency into Canadian funds.   As a result of the 
investigation, a police officer obtained a search 
warrant to search the accused’s property under s.11 of 
the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. The 
officer’s grounds for belief included hydro 
consumption records, surveillance, a high traffic 
volume to the residence, criminal records including 
drug convictions of those attending the residence, the 
odour of marihuana on money that was exchanged,  
security lights and a large fence around the property, 
and the choice of property being difficult for police to 
surveille. The search warrant allowed police to search 
the residence, basement suite, outbuildings, and 
vehicles situated at the property for marihuana, 
equipment and tools used, money, score sheets and 
documentation for the offences of production, 
trafficking, and possession of property obtained by 
the commission of drug-related offences.
Police entered onto the accused’s property and 
observed him coming out of one of the bay doors of a 
detached garage at the back of the property. Four 
other men were standing in front of the garage and all 
were arrested, including the accused, for trafficking 
in a controlled substance. The accused was turned over 
to another officer who re-arrested him and advised 
him of his Charter rights. The accused said he wanted 
to speak to a lawyer as soon as possible, but was not 
provided an opportunity until some two hours later. In 
total, nine persons on the property were arrested, 
including the accused’s wife. She was found, along with 
her two children, in a small office area in the detached 
garage.
The police searched the property but did not find a 
marihuana grow operation. Rather, they seized 16 
separately wrapped one-half pound bags of marihuana, 
a plastic bag containing 217 grams of marihuana, score 
sheets, and drug-related paraphernalia, three plastic 
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garbage bags of marihuana stalks and buds, various 
documents in the residence and detached garage 
connecting the accused and his wife to the property,  
and a large screen television, a Sea-Doo, a snowmobile, 
and several vehicles.
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court the accused 
argued the search warrant was invalid, the officer 
lacked the reasonable grounds necessary to arrest 
him, and that his right to counsel was breached. The 
trial judge, however, held that the grounds for the 
warrant amounted to a credibly-based probability that 
marihuana was being grown and sold on the accused’s 
property and that an occupant was in possession of 
property obtained by the commission of drug-related 
offences. As for the accused’s arrest, it was lawful. 
The judge found the police were justified in not 
immediately providing the accused with an opportunity 
to contact a lawyer, due to the logistics of having to 
deal with a number of arrested persons at once, but 
should have when they had the situation uncer control 
and the arrestees were taken to the police 
detachment. Thus the accused’s rights under s.10(b) 
were breached. The evidence was admitted under 
s.24(2) and the accused was convicted of possessing 
marihuana for the purpose of trafficking. The accused 
then appealed to the British Columbia Court of Appeal. 
Reasonable Grounds: Warrant
The accused contended that the warrant for his 
property was overbroad and the reasonable grounds 
for it did not allow for the entire property and all the 
structures on it to be searched.   He submitted that 
the police only had enough grounds to believe that 
evidence of drug-related offences would be found in 
the basement suite belonging to his tenant.
 
In noting that the reasonable grounds standard 
requires something more than mere suspicion, but less 
than “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” or a “prima 
facie case”, and even less than the standard applicable 
in civil matters of proof on the balance of 
probabilities, Justice Frankel, delivering the judgment 
for the unanimous appeal court, described it this way:
A determination with respect to whether 
reasonable grounds exist requires a consideration of 
the “totality of the circumstances”. This means 
that, “it is important that the Information be 
examined as a whole and not one piece of evidence 
at a time, because each piece of evidence colours 
other pieces of evidence and a fuller picture 
emerges by considering all of the evidence 
together”.   
Further, the assessment of the facts relied upon to 
establish reasonable grounds is made on a practical, 
non-technical, and common sense basis. [T]he person 
deciding whether the reasonable grounds standard 
has been met is entitled to “put two and two 
together”. 
When a judicial order authorizing a search or 
seizure is challenged at trial, the trial judge’s role 
is to determine whether the order could have been 
granted.  This determination is made based on the 
record which was before the authorizing judicial 
officer as amplified on the review. “[T]he test is 
whether there was reliable evidence that might 
reasonably be believed on the basis of which the 
authorization could have issued, not whether, in the 
opinion of the reviewing judge, the application 
should have been granted at all by the authorizing 
judge”. [references omitted, paras. 41-43] 
In this case, Justice Frankel agreed there were 
reasonable grounds to believe that evidence of 
marihuana-related offences would be found on the 
accused’s property as a whole, not just in the basement 
suite. However, he disagreed that the electrical billing 
records provided reasonable grounds to believe there 
was a marihuana grow operation on the property. The 
officer compared the amount of electricity used at 
the property during the preceding two years against 
his own residence over the same period.  But he did not 
account for another building behind the residence on 
the accused’s property that he did not know what it 
was used for.  Given that there was more than one 
building on the the accused’s property, the officer’s 
comparative analysis was of no value and without this 
flawed interpretation of the billing records, there was 
nothing to support a reasonable belief that marihuana 
production was taking place.  
However, when severed,  there were still reasonable 
grounds to search for the other items listed in the 
warrant in connection with the investigation of the 
trafficking and possession of the proceeds of crime 
offences.  The police were, therefore, authorized to 
search the entire property for marihuana, score 
sheets, documentation, and other items relating to 
those offences. The search warrant for the entire 
property was properly issued and the seizure of the 
drugs and other items did not violate the accused’s s.8 
Charter rights.
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Reasonable Grounds: Arrest
The accused argued that his arrest was both unlawful 
and arbitrary because neither arresting officer knew 
who he was when they arrested him. The Crown, on the 
other hand, contended that both officers subjectively 
believed they had reasonable grounds to arrest under 
s.495(1)(a) of the Criminal 
Code and that their grounds 
were objectively reasonable. 
And if not, the Crown 
submitted that the police had 
reasonable grounds to arrest 
every adult person on the 
property.  
There was no evidence that the 
arresting officers knew who 
they were arresting.  Neither 
had seen the accused before 
nor took steps prior to 
executing the search warrant 
to ascertain his appearance. Thus, the accused and the 
other men found standing by the detached garage 
were arrested simply because they were there. The 
police, absent knowledge the accused was the person 
under investigation when they arrested him, lacked 
the necessary objective grounds to justify his arrest.
And although there may be circumstances where the 
police have reasonable grounds to arrest everyone at 
a particular place, this was not such a case.  The police 
had no basis to infer that the property in this case 
was being used solely for drug-related activity. Nor 
did they have reason to believe that everyone visiting 
the property was involved in criminal activity. Justice 
Frankel said this:
The fact that a person is at, or inside, a place 
believed to contain drugs, and in respect of which 
a search warrant has been issued, does not, without 
more, provide objective grounds for his or her 
arrest. The police are not entitled to arrest first 
and then determine whether the person arrested 
is connected to the offence(s) under investigation.  
[In this case] it cannot be said that there were 
objective reasonable grounds to believe that every 
adult found on the property was involved in the 
drug-related criminal activity believed to be taking 
place there.  Accordingly, [the accused’s] arrest as 
a found-in was unlawful.  [paras. 60-61]
However, not all unlawful arrests result in arbitrary 
detention under s.9 of the Charter. But in this case 
the accused’s s.9 rights were breached. Justice 
Frankel stated:
In my view, [the accused] was arbitrarily 
detained.  The police arrested him with the four 
other men who were standing in 
front of the garage, simply because 
he was there. That the officers 
subjectively believed they had 
reasonable grounds to arrest every 
adult on the property does not 
justify their actions.   Even though 
this belief was honestly held, it was 
not a reasonable one given that the 
police knew it was likely that 
persons unconnected with criminal 
activity would be on the property.
The situation is exacerbated by the 
fact that the police did not 
determine [the accused’s] 
appearance before the arrest, even 
though he was one of the persons under 
investigation and the owner of the property to be 
searched. I am not suggesting this is a requirement 
in all cases.  However, as there was no urgency, and 
a photograph of [the accused] was available (likely 
because of his prior criminal history), the police 
should have taken steps to find out what he looked 
like before going onto his property. [paras. 63-64]
And the arbitrariness issue could not be saved by the 
common law power of investigative detention which 
requires a lower standard than reasonable grounds for 
belief. “The difficulty with this argument is that the 
police did not invoke the common law power of 
investigative detention; they invoked the statutory 
power of arrest, with its more extensive power of 
incidental search of the person,” said Justice Frankel. 
“When the police have wrongfully arrested someone, 
their actions cannot be defended on the basis that 
they could have detained this person on some other 
basis.  In deciding whether the police infringed 
Charter rights, they are to be judged on what they 
did, not what they could have done.” And the Court 
declined to express an opinion whether the common 
law could authorize the police to “detain”, as opposed 
to “arrest”, a person merely because he or she is found 
at or in a place being searched pursuant to a warrant. 
 
“The fact that a person is at, or 
inside, a place believed to contain 
drugs, and in respect of which a 
search warrant has been issued, 
does not, without more, provide 
objective grounds for his or her 
arrest. The police are not entitled to 
arrest first and then determine 
whether the person arrested is 
connected to the offence(s) under 
investigation. “
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Admissibility
Despite the Charter breaches the evidence was 
admissible under s.24(2). The evidence was non-
conscriptive and its admission would not affect trial 
fairness. The police did not intentionally violate the 
Charter which lessens the seriousness of the breaches 
and militates in favour of admission. As well, the search 
was conducted pursuant to a valid warrant and the 
discovery of the drugs and other items occurred 
independent of the s.9 and s.10(b) breaches.  Any 
connection between the breaches and the discovery of 
the evidence was temporal, not causal. And all of the 
evidence would have been discovered even if no one had 
been present when the police executed the warrants. 
Finally, the offences were serious.  Thus, the exclusion 
of the evidence, rather than its admission, would bring 
the administration of justice into disrepute.  
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
NEW LAWS (continued from page 1)
If a complainant is 12 or 13 years old and the accused 
is less than two years older (but not in a position of 
trust or authority or in a dependent or exploitive 
relationship), consent is a defence. Similarly, if the 
complainant is 14 years old but less than 16, consent is 
a defence if the accused is married to the complainant 
or  less than five years older and not in a position of 
trust or authority or in a  dependent or exploitive 
relationship. 
The offence of luring a child by means of a computer 
has also been amended in the Criminal Code. It is now 
an offence to communicate by means of computer with 
a person believed to be under 16 for the purpose of 
facilitating sexual interference, invitation to sexual 
touching, bestiality in the presence of or by a child, 
indecent exposure, or abduction. 
Impaired Driving 
Effective July 2, 2008 several new provisions dealing 
with drug impaired drivers will also come into effect. 
Currently, under s.254(2) of the Criminal Code, a peace 
officer may demand a roadside test into an approved 
screening device where they reasonably suspect a 
person operating a motor vehicle  has alcohol in their 
body. With the new amendments roadside testing will 
now be permitted when:
• The officer has reasonable grounds to suspect a 
person has alcohol or a drug in their body;
• In the case of alcohol, the officer can use an 
approved screening device or demand physical 
coordination tests prescribed by regulation;
• In the case of a drug, the officer can also demand 
physical coordination tests prescribed by 
regulation; and
• The demand can be given up to three hours after 
driving or care and control.
The phrase “believes on reasonable and probable 
grounds” will be dropped from the breathalyzer 
demand section (s.254(3)) and replaced with 
“reasonable grounds to believe.” 
If the officer believes the person is impaired by a 
drug, or by drugs and alcohol, they will be able to 
demand the person submit to an evaluation by an 
evaluating officer to determine whether the person’s 
ability to operate a vehicle is impaired. If the 
evaluating officer is then satisfied there are 
reasonable grounds to believe the person is impaired by 
a drug or both drugs and alcohol, they will be able to 
demand a sample of oral fluid, urine or blood. If a 
person refuses or fails to provide a sample they commit 
an offence. 
The penalties for impaired driving, over 80mg% and  
refusal will also rise. 
Impaired, Over 80mg%, Refusal Punishment Grid
Old New
First 
offence
Minimum $600 
fine
Minimum $1000 
fine
Second 
offence
Minimum 14 days 
in jail
Minimum 30 days 
in jail
Subsequent 
offences
Minimum 90 days 
in jail
Minimum 120 days 
in jail
By 
indictment
Maximum 5 years No change
Summarily Maximum 6 
months
Maximum 18 
months
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concentration (BAC) tests are proof, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, of the BAC at the time of 
driving (if taken no later than two hours after the 
offence) under s.258(1)(c). The new law will state that 
“evidence of the results of the analyses ... is conclusive 
proof” of the BAC at the time of driving unless the 
accused can show all of the following:
• The instrument was malfunctioning or operated 
improperly,
• The malfunction or improper operation resulted in 
the BAC result exceeding 80mg%, and
• The accused’s BAC would not in fact have exceeded 
80mg% at the time of the offence.
If the test results are different, the lowest 
concentration will be used. 
There are also evidentiary changes to the presumption 
of identity for blood samples under s.258(1)(d) and the 
over 80mg% presumption under s.258(1)(d.1). Court 
challenges will likely be limited to scientific evidence. 
See www.parl.gc.ca for more information. 
The legislation also clarifies that a video recording may 
be made of the coordination tests under s.254(2) or 
the evaluation under s.254(3).
As it stands now, only impaired driving causing 
accidents (where bodily harm or death results) has an 
increased penalty. The new laws will create offences 
for causing accidents while over 80mg%. For example, 
a person over 80mg% who causes an accident resulting 
in bodily harm will be subject to a maximum 10 year 
prison sentence. If a person over 80mg% causes an 
accident resulting in death they could go to jail for life. 
And refusing the tests after an accident also brings 
harsher sentences. If a person refuses and at the time 
knew or ought to have known their operation of the 
vehicle caused an accident resulting in bodily harm they 
could face a maximum 10 year sentence. Similarly If a 
person refuses and at the time knew or ought to have 
known their operation of a vehicle caused an accident 
resulting in death they could face a maximum life 
sentence.
The presumptions of identity for breathalyzer 
readings will also change. Presently, blood alcohol 
NEW FIREARMS OFFENCE SENTENCING GRID
Section Offence Old Punishment New Punishment
s.95 Possess loaded prohibited or 
restricted firearm or with readily 
accessible ammunition
Dual offence
By indictment
• minimum 1 yr
• maximum 10 yrs
Summarily
• maximum 1 yr
Strictly indictable offence
• first offence
• minimum 3 yrs
• maximum 10 yrs
• second and subsequent offences
• minimum 5 yrs
• maximum 10 yrs
s.99 Trafficking in firearms, prohibited 
devices, ammunition, or 
prohibited ammunition
Strictly indictable offence
By indictment
• minimum 1 yr
• maximum 10 yrs
Strictly indictable offence
• first offence
• minimum 3 yrs
• maximum 10 yrs
• second and subsequent offences
• minimum 5 yrs
• maximum 10 yrs
s.100 Possessing firearms, prohibited 
devices, ammunition, or 
prohibited ammunition for the 
purpose of trafficking
Strictly indictable offence
By indictment
• minimum 1 yr
• maximum 10 yrs
Strictly indictable offence
• first offence
• minimum 3 yrs
• maximum 10 yrs
• second and subsequent offences
• minimum 5 yrs
• maximum 10 yrs
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Section Offence Old Punishment New Punishment
s.103 Unauthorized importation or 
exportation of a firearm, 
prohibited device, or prohibited 
ammunition
Strictly indictable offence
By indictment
• minimum 1 yr
• maximum 10 yrs
Strictly indictable offence
• first offence
• minimum 3 yrs
• maximum 10 yrs
• second and subsequent offences
• minimum 5 yrs
• maximum 10 yrs
s.239 Attempted murder with restricted 
or prohibited firearm 
Strictly indictable offence
By indictment
• minimum 4 yrs
• maximum life
Strictly indictable offence
• first offence
• minimum 5 yrs
• maximum life
• second and subsequent offences
• minimum 7 yrs
• maximum life
s.244 Discharging a restricted or 
prohibited firearm with intent
Strictly indictable offence
By indictment
• minimum 4 yrs
• maximum life
Strictly indictable offence
• first offence
• minimum 5 yrs
• maximum 14 yrs
• second and subsequent offences
• minimum 7 yrs
• maximum 10 yrs
s.272 Sexual assault with restricted or 
prohibited firearm
Strictly indictable offence
By indictment
• minimum 4 yrs
• maximum 14 yrs
Strictly indictable offence
• first offence
• minimum 5 yrs
• maximum 14 yrs
• second and subsequent offences
• minimum 7 yrs
• maximum 10 yrs
s.273 Aggravated sexual assault with a 
restricted or prohibited firearm
Strictly indictable offence
By indictment
• minimum 4 yrs
• maximum life
Strictly indictable offence
• first offence
• minimum 5 yrs
• maximum life
• second and subsequent offences
• minimum 7 yrs
• maximum life
s.279(1.1)
s.279.1
s.344
s.346(1.1)
Kidnapping with a restricted or 
prohibited firearm
Hostage taking with a restricted 
or prohibited firearm
Robbery with a restricted or 
prohibited firearm
Extortion using a restricted or 
prohibited firearm
Strictly indictable offence
By indictment
• minimum 4 yrs
• maximum life
Strictly indictable offence
• first offence
• minimum 5 yrs
• maximum life
• second and subsequent offences
• minimum 7 yrs
• maximum life
Note: If a firearm is used in the above noted offences but it is not a restricted or prohibited type, then a four year minimum 
sentence is mandatory.
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